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ABSTRACT
The dairy market environment in the United States of America and in Europe is
changing partially due to a change in policies supporting free markets. The effect
of the change in the dairy market environment in the United States and Germany
on cooperative organization, competition, and price risk management is
elaborated in this thesis by means of a literature survey including governmental
documents, industry documents, and published scientific articles.
The thesis provides a closer look to the interaction between two players within the
dairy market chain, i.e. the farmers and the processors. Both players are
confronted with increasing accessibility of the markets which increases the
importance of trade and increases the volatility of the price. Dairy cooperatives
transform their organizational structure in order to adapt strategies to cope with
the increasing international competition. However, the consolidation present on
the procurers‟ side of the market puts dairy farmers in a weak bargaining position.
Policy makers are aware of these malfunctions within the market and are
suggesting alternative policies that are conform to the World Trade Organization
negotiations. The stimulation of producer organizations, interbranch organizations
and the use of futures markets and contracting to reduce price risk are advised by
the European Commission and the United States Department of Agriculture. The
market changes and policy changes create opportunities for farmers and
processors in both countries to diversify and to increase production. Processors
have the opportunity to become world players.
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1 Introduction
The dairy sectors in Germany and the United States of America are at the break of
a new era. From closed, protected markets, marked by a surplus, an evolution is
taking place to open markets aiming to supply an increasing world demand.
The dairy sectors in Germany and the U.S. are highly regulated by several
policies and programs. The most famous of these programs in Europe is the quota
system. In the United States, Milk Marketing Orders provide farmers with a
pooled price and provide consumers with access to milk. These and other policies
and programs highly influence the market environment. In the context of the
agreements within the World Trade Organization, dairy policies have been
adapted and revised towards green box compatibilities. Change in dairy policy
induces future uncertainty for the players involved.
Due to changes in policy, production structure is changing. Small scaled family
farms in Germany and the U.S. became more capital intensive. Due to
technological and scientific innovations, the production and efficiency level of
production has increased, resulting in fewer farms with a higher production. The
market conditions for dairies also changed over time. The competition on the
market became harder. Dairies restructure organization and adapt new strategies
in order to keep up with more concentrated retailers and with competition in the
processing sector. Dairies also concentrate more and more on the international
market by not only exporting but also through direct investments. Traditionally
cooperatives played an important role in procuring farmers milk. The increase of
competition and the requirement of dairies to adapt quickly to market changes
1

changed the cooperative organizational form. Cooperatives restructured to
enhance efficiency by increasing capital access and decreasing the transaction
cost of the decision making process.
An increase of concentration in the processing sector and the characteristics of
milk introduce the importance of space in the procurement market. This affected
the coop-member relationship which was observable during the dairy crisis of
2009 when members decided to not deliver milk anymore to their own
cooperatives.
With the opening of markets, an increase in price volatility is observable. This
induces opportunities as well as threats for the players on the market. In order to
reduce the price risk several options are available, that is private initiatives by
hedging risk on a futures market or public initiatives by introducing new policies
that stimulate the dairy sector to adapt and take a strong position in the new
market environment.

This thesis aims to provide a closer look into the implications of changing policy
and market structure on the procurement market for raw milk in the United States
and Germany. It seeks to investigate the interrelationship between two parties in
the dairy value chain; farmers and processors, and their future opportunities. To
achieve this, insight in the present market policies, market structure evolution,
cooperative organization, competition and contracting as a means to reduce price
risk is provided.

2

The study uses secondary information through a literature survey. Theoretical
models are used to understand the implications of certain policies, to discuss the
transformation of cooperatives to more entrepreneurial business forms and to
explain competition and the influence of space on the procurement market for raw
milk. Official reports are used to produce an insight in the objectives of the parties
involved.

The succeeding parts of the study are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a
description of important policies influencing the dairy market is provided. The
policies discussed in this chapter are reduced to the ones that influence the market
directly. In Chapter 3, the market and the changed structure of producers and
dairies is discussed. In Chapter 4, the importance of cooperatives on the dairy
market is shown and the change of cooperative organization and strategies is
investigated. In Chapter 5, the discussion is based on competition between dairies
and its effect on the price paid to producers using industrial organization theory.
Chapter 6 deals with the use of contracts on the market. A closer look to the U.S.
futures market is provided. Chapter 7 looks at the future prospects for the players
on the dairy market and the responses of the policy makers towards the changing
market conditions. Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of this study.

3

4

2 Dairy Policy
Dairy policies, implemented by government, regulate the market for milk in the
U.S. as well as in Germany. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) legislated
by the European Commission determines the ground rules of intervention in the
market in Germany. The CAP was last reviewed in 2008, under the so-called
“Health Check”. The next review of the CAP is planned for 2013. In the U.S., the
Farm Bill contains the ground rules of intervention in the market. The Farm Bill is
legislated by the Federal Government and was last reviewed in 2008.
Traditionally the Farm Bill is reviewed every four years; the next review is
planned in 2012.
2.1 EU Dairy Policy
The common organization of the market in milk and milk products was
established in 1964. This was substituted during the Agenda 2000-reform by
Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999. The policy article comprises several market
instruments for dairy products, such as the public intervention, private storage,
export refunds, internal disposal aids, tariffs and the milk quota.

During the Health-Check in 2008, the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU was
reformed. The idea was to open up the agricultural markets to world trade
according to the WTO agreements. For that reason, market intervention systems
are reduced in their impact. Export support is reduced, intervention stocks are
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reduced, milk premiums as income support are no longer connected to production
and the quota system will be abolished with the method of the soft-landing.

Overall the goals of the CAP for dairy are (European Court of Auditors, 2009):
-

stabilize the milk market

-

stabilize the prices for milk

-

provide farmers a decent standard of living

-

improve the competition level of the dairy producers on the international
markets

In the next subchapters, the policies under the first pillar “Agricultural Markets”
of the CAP will be discussed. The second pillar is dealing with rural development.
As the policies under the second pillar do not influence the market directly, these
will be left out of the discussion.
2.1.1 Quota
The quota system was implemented in the member states of the EU in 1984. The
EU was dealing with overproduction. Storing this overproduction became more
and more expensive so reducing production became necessary. Based on
historical production, quotas were distributed among the member states. Germany
was allocated 23.487 million tonnes1 in 1984/85 (Kleinhanss et al., 2010). After
the unification of West- and East Germany in 1991/92, 6.804 million tonnes were

1

1 tonne [t] = 1 metric ton; 1 pound [lb] = 0.4536 kilogram [kg]; 1 hundredweight
[cwt] = 100 pounds.
6

allocated to the farmers in the new federal states. The member states distributed
the quota among farmers based on former production minus the necessary
reductions in order for the national quota not to exceed. As the production in the
EU was still exceeding the domestic consumption, the quotas were reduced by
10.5% in 1992/93 compared to the level of implementation. The change of quota
over the years 1984-2006 is shown in Figure 2-1.
Different quota trade systems were established on member state level in order to
make quota acquisition by efficient farmers possible. In Germany, when the quota
was implemented, it was attached to the land. This involved that transfer of quota
was only possible when the land was transferred too (Hüttel et al., 2005). In
1990/91 farmers had the possibility to lease milk quota. In 1992/93 milk quota
transfer without land was introduced. In 2000 the German milk quota system was
reformed. Leasing was not possible anymore and a regionalized auction system
was introduced to trade quota. A small amount of the transferred quota is taken by
government and kept in a national reserve and can be reallocated to young
farmers or farmers in hardship.
To make the quota binding a levy was implemented. This involves a fine for an
individual farmer when the national quota and the individual quota are exceeded.
The levy decreased over the last years being EUR 33.27 per 100kg milk
overproduced to EUR 27.83 for 2007/08 and thereafter (European Commission,
2011a).
In order to fulfill the WTO agreements on free trade, the EU policy for dairy
needed some adjustments. During the Health Check, it was decided to phase out
7

the quota by means of a “Soft Landing”. This involved a gradual increase of the
quota system with 2% in 2008 and a yearly increase with 1% over the next five
milk years until 31st March 2015 when the policy will be terminated.

Figure 2-1: National German milk quota.
Data: Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer
Protection (2010) and German Dairy Association (2011).

The quota system was implemented to balance out supply and demand. In Figure
2-2 the effect of the implementation of quota on the market is illustrated.
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Figure 2-2: Quota effect.

The implementation of a quota results in an inelastic supply, i.e. curve S‟. This
has an augmenting effect on the price for producers and consumers. The
equilibrium price Peq rises to P‟. However, at such a price producers would
produce Qs‟. To avoid this, a levy was implemented. In order to hold the level of
the quota, the levy should be higher than the difference of the price obtained with
the quota, i.e. P‟, and the producer‟s marginal cost price at the level of production
under the quota, i.e. Ps. This is also called the “quota rent” as it is the additional
profit for the farmer. The closer the quota level is to the market equilibrium, the
lower the rent. Importers are attracted due to the higher price on the domestic
market. To avoid import and stimulate export, protectionist measures, as import
taxes and export subsidies, are implemented. It is obvious that, when the world
9

market price is lower than the domestic price, the cost for the consumer and
government is positive. However, for the producer it generates additional profit
and creates stable prices as it protects the domestic price from fluctuations of the
world market price. When the quotas were implemented, they were distributed to
farmers based on their traditional production. Nowadays, when a farmer wants to
start a dairy business, he has to purchase quota. The price of quota on the regional
auctions in Germany is based on supply and demand. Since April 2000, it became
the only possible way to transfer quota, exceptions are allowed in cases of transfer
of whole farms or parts thereof, by inheritance or between direct relatives
(Kleinhans et al., 2011). The transfer of quota without land resulted in a price
increase, particularly at the end of the quota year when quota was purchased in
order to prevent paying a super levy. Prices were between 0.65 and 0.90 EUR/kg.
Due to these high prices, transfer of quota through the auctions stayed limited (2.4
million tonnes) and most of the transfer was done between relatives (2.6 million
tonnes) (Kleinhans et al., 2011). The transfer of quota without land gave more
flexibility to farmers to manage expansion of their production. Due to rising
production per cow, quota purchase was needed even when the herd did not
expand. The transfer without land made it possible to allocate quota to more
efficient (low marginal cost) dairy farmers. Transfer without land resulted in
eliminating the initial quota allocation inefficiency (Jongeneel et al., 2008). In a
study by Alvarez et al. (2006) in Spain, it was shown that under a good
functioning quota market the efficiency influences the willingness to buy quota
the most, whilst the size of the farm had even a negative effect. Out of interviews
10

with farmers and experts in Germany, it was indicated that the main effects of the
milk quota scheme and the restrictions on quota mobility are a slower and stunted
development of the farms and their production (Kleinhanss et al, 2010). Quota
transfer without land, and since 2007, quota transfer through auctions with only
two trading zones, i.e. West- and East-Germany, benefits the competition level of
the dairy sector in Germany.
However, as shown in the graph in Figure 2-2, a quota system results in a higher
price than the equilibrium price which results in a higher cost for the consumer as
well as for government as they need to protect the market by subsidizing net
exports. In order to fulfill the WTO agreements, the EC decided to abolish the
quota with the procedure of the Soft Landing. By gradually increasing the quota,
the EC wants to phase out its effect. One indicator to look at the effect of the
quota is the price of quota. The price of quota is influenced by several indicators.
In an auction, however, where supply and demand define the price, we can
assume that the price is close to the quota rent, that is the benefit farmers can get
out of it. In Germany this price has been decreasing since 2006. When it used to
be approx. 0.50 EUR/kg in 2006, it was approx. 0.10 EUR/kg in 2010 (Kleinhanss
et al., 2010). Whether there is overproduction or not, could indicate the binding
character of the quota. Figure 2-3 shows an underproduction for the quota years
2008/09 and 2009/10. Following the European trend, the method of the Soft
Landing had its impact by phasing out the effects of the quota system on the
German dairy market. The quota is not binding to production in Germany.

11

However it must be mentioned that due to the super levy farmers could have been
precautious and produced less than they would when there was no super levy.

Figure 2-3: Percentage of deviation of production to quota in Germany.
Data: European Commission (2010d) and Kleinhanss et al. (2010).

Several studies examined the effect of the abolishment of the quota. In a study by
Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2008) the effects of the gradual increase of the
quota in the EU are a price decline and a production increase. However, the
production increase is not filling the quota increase. This is because the price
decline results in a smaller increase of production, making the quota less relevant.
The effect of a price decline is accelerating the abundance of the quota. In a study
by Lips et al. (2004) the same effect on the European level was concluded for the
milk price and the production quantity when the quota system would be abolished
in 2002. In Germany a production decline instead of a production increase was
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predicted due to a high price decline for raw milk in comparison with the quota
rent.
2.1.2 Intervention for Butter and Skimmed Milk Powder
The EU intervenes in the market by buying butter and skimmed milk powder
(SMP) when the price on the market is below the minimum price of 246.39
EUR/100kg for butter and 169.80 euro/100kg for SMP. The intervention of butter
is limited to 30,000 tonnes and to 109,000 tonnes for skimmed milk powder
(European Commission, 2011a). The minimum prices for these dairy products
have a milk equivalent (ME) price of 215 EUR/tonne (European Commission,
2009a).
This measure has a direct impact on the price for dairy products on the market. By
intervening, the government is increasing the demand, which results in a price
increase on the market. The budget of the government can suffer under long
periods of overproduction. Limits on the intervention quantities rule out unwanted
large budget expenditures but also limit the intervention strength of the measure.
2.1.3 Direct Payments
In order to fulfill the WTO agreements, market measures are reduced. However in
order to meet the goals of the CAP direct payments were installed. To maintain
these goals direct payments are increased. In 2006, 36% of the income of German
farmers consisted of subsidies (European Court of Auditors, 2009). During the
CAP-reform of 2003 it was decided to decouple the payments from production. In
2009 87% of the support was decoupled (Iván, 2009). The EU wanted to decouple
13

payments from production in order to prevent production support. Direct support
lowers the marginal production cost which has an effect comparable to an export
subsidy on the market. Fixing the direct payments (based on historical payments
per individual farmer or per region) can then be regarded as an income support
that is not influencing production. This support is called “Single Payment
Scheme”. The main aim, according to the European Commission for Agriculture
and Rural Development, is to guarantee farmers a more stable income and to
financially compensate farmers for the high standards of environmental protection,
animal welfare and consumer protection in the EU compared to the production
requirements in non-EU countries (European Commission, 2011b). A fixed
payment does not lower marginal costs; however it can be regarded as lowering
the average costs. As economic theory teaches us, this does not influence
production on short term as producers produce until the marginal cost is equal to
the price of their product. However, a simulation carried out by Helming and
Peerlings (2003), shows that when the quota is abolished, decoupled direct
payments influence production positively in the Netherlands.

Due to the extreme low raw milk price in the beginning of 2009, an additional one
time payment to dairy farmers was made. For Germany this was an amount of
EUR61.20 million, which the German government had to divide among its dairy
farmers by June 2010 (Capreform, 2011).

14

2.1.4 Export Refunds

Export refunds for dairy products (butter and SMP) were reintroduced in January
2009. This market measure was reintroduced due to the low prices for dairy
products on the world market in combination with the financial crisis resulting in
difficult times for exporters and farmers. In order to encourage farmers to
continue production, the amount between the world price and the domestic prices
is bridged to traders depending on the country of destination (European
Commission, 2011a). Export refunds stimulate production directly as they
increase the domestic price for producers.

2.2 United States of America Dairy Policy
The U.S. dairy policies are many and are dealing with different issues. Some
policies are implemented to provide a stable price, some are supporting fluid milk
supply in areas where the demand is high, some help dairy farmers in difficult
financial situations by one time payments and some are promoting the export of
dairy products. The dairy programs can be federal or state programs. Two major
federal dairy programs are the Federal Milk Marketing Orders and the Milk Price
Support Program (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010a).
2.2.1 Federal Milk Marketing Orders

Federal Milk Marketing Orders were established by the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937. They have been subject to many changes since then. The
2008 Farm Bill established 10 Federal milk marketing orders (Figure 2-4). Of the
15

total U.S. fluid milk, Federal Milk Marketing Orders regulate 80 percent. 15
percent is regulated by the California Milk Marketing Order.

Figure 2-4: Milk Marketing Order Areas U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2010b).

These orders are implemented to benefit producers and consumers by marketing
the milk over state levels by the U.S. government. The orders include fluid milk
and manufactured products. Due to geographical price differences and
geographical production differences the marketing orders divide common
revenues among producers and provide dairy products to consumers in the U.S.
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on a stable basis. Farmers deliver fluid milk (Grade A milk2) which is processed
and sold as manufactured products or fluid milk. The milk price varies according
to the product it is manufactured in. This classified pricing system is set up by
government (State of California or Federal) to set minimum prices processors
have to pay to farmers according to the use of the raw milk. The classified pricing
system has four classes:


Class I. Grade A milk used in all beverage milks.



Class II. Grade A milk used in fluid cream products, yogurts, or perishable
manufactured products (ice cream, cottage cheese, and others).



Class III. Grade A milk used to produce cream cheese and hard
manufactured cheese.



Class IV. Grade A milk used to produce butter and any milk in dried form.

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2010c).

Due to the marketing orders, government makes it possible to combine revenues
of farm milk sales and divide them more equally among producers by blending
the price of milk for the different classes. This is referred to as revenue pooling
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010a).

2

Grade A milk: The Food and Drugs Administration developed, along with the 50
States and Puerto Rico, a model document called the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance
that is adopted as the Grade "A" milk law in the 50 States and Puerto Rico. All
Grade "A" products must come from dairy farms and dairy plants that meet the
requirements of the Pasteurized Milk Ordinance in order to be shipped interstate.
At State level permits for producers to have the right to deliver Grade A milk are
distributed if the producer provides certain qualities (low bacteria level, absence
of antibiotics …) for the milk. (Michigan Government, 2010)
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2.2.2 Price Support Program
The Agricultural Act of 1949 made it possible to support dairy farmers by
government purchase of dairy products to reduce supply on the market and
guarantee a minimum price for raw milk to farmers. The Farm Bill of 2008 made
a change in the milk support purchase program by specifying the support prices of
purchased manufactured products, not the price of raw milk. The name of the
price support program changed from Milk Price Support Program to Dairy
Product Price Support Program (DPPSP). This change was made in order to
reduce the impact of this policy on the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS)
calculated by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2007, the Milk Price
Support Program contributed 25% of the AMS for all U.S. agriculture (Jesse et al.,
2008). The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) buys butter, cheddar cheese
and nonfat dry milk. The support purchase prices are:


not less than $1.05 per pound for butter,



not less than $1.13 per pound for cheese in blocks,



not less than $1.10 per pound for cheese in barrels, and



Not less than $0.80 per pound for nonfat dry milk.

The CCC can sell the inventory back on the market under the restriction of selling
10 percent above purchasing price. In order to prevent net removals by the CCC
to be very high, net removal3 triggers are implemented. This involves that at a
certain quantity of net removals by the CCC, the purchase price may be reduced.
3

Net removals equal price support purchases plus DEIP removals minus
unrestricted sales back into the market (Jesse et al., 2008)
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These support prices have the equivalent of $9.90 per hundredweight of milk for
producers as under the former Milk Price Support Program legislated in the Farm
Bill of 2002 (Jesse et al., 2008). However the CCC purchase prices are so low that
if reached, the farm milk price would be below production cost resulting in a
quick response of supply. The only significant purchase since 1990 by the CCC is
the purchase of nonfat dry milk (Jesse et al., 2008). The idea to abolish or replace
the program is discussed as it is also in contradiction with the WTO agreements.
However farmers and cooperatives are afraid that by taking out the minimum
safety net, prices could drop below $9.90 per hundredweight (Jesse et al., 2010).
2.2.3 Export subsidies and Import Tariff Rate Quotas
The Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) supports exporters of dairy products
to meet prevailing world prices for specific dairy products and specific foreign
markets. This support is monetary making it possible for exporters to sell dairy
products below purchasing cost. The aim of the program is to establish foreign
markets for U.S. dairy products where there is a reduced competition level due to
protectionist measures of the foreign countries.
The DEIP was reauthorized by the Food, Agricultural, Conservation and Trade
Act of 1990, the Uruguay Agreement Act of 1995 and the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. However, due to the WTO agreements,
the U.S. has established ceilings for annual export subsidies and export subsidized
quantities by commodity (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010d). The 2008
Farm Bill emphasized the use of DEIP to its maximum taking into account the
U.S. trade agreements.
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The DEIP subsidies did not play an important role in the export of butter and
cheese. In the export of nonfat dry milk the DEIP-program was important. Since
2003 however the prices for nonfat dry milk on the world market are often above
the CCC purchase price and often above the wholesale prices in the U.S. making
the DEIP subsidies unnecessary (Jesse et al. 2008).
Import is also controlled. Before the U.S. was a member of the WTO this
happened with import quota, however when the U.S. became a member of WTO
they established the tariff rate quota. These TRQs are administered through
licenses for imports of specific products from specific countries or regions (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2010e). The TRQs set a low tariff for a certain
quantity. When more is imported then the set quantity, a higher tariff is applied.
2.2.4 Direct payments
The Milk Income Loss Contract program (MILC-program) was reauthorized by
the 2008 Farm Bill and is in act until September 30 2012 (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2010f). The program provides countercyclical payments to the dairy
farmers on a monthly basis. The amount of monetary support is based on the
Boston Federal Milk Marketing Order Class I price for fluid milk. The benchmark
price is $16.94/cwt. If the price is below the benchmark price, government
provides payments to milk producers. These payments are adapted to changing
feed costs and certain per year per operation pound limits apply 4 (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2010f). The MILC-payments are production
4

Payments are to be made on up to 2.985 million pounds of milk per fiscal year
per operation during October 1, 2008, to August 31, 2012, using a rate of 45
percent of the difference noted above (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010f).
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connected until a certain limit. Jesse and Cropp (2008) estimated that 44 percent
of the U.S. milk production was covered and 83 percent of the U.S. dairy herds
were covered in 2007. During 2010, only in April a MILC-payment of 0.2115
$/cwt was made to farmers. For the other months the Boston class I price was
higher than the adjusted MILC benchmark price.
The Dairy Economic Loss Assistance Payment program also supports the income
of farmers. This program assists dairy farmers who incurred low milk prices from
February through July 2009 by providing them with a one time payment. The
payments intend to compensate the farmers for selling below production cost due
to the low prices on the market that period. The Agricultural Appropriations Act
for fiscal year 2010 provides $290 million in direct payments to dairy producers.
This program can be benefited by producers who have an annual nonfarm income
of $500,000 or less. The payment for each producer will be calculated by dividing
the total available fund by the total marketed pounds during February 2009 until
July 2009, multiplied by the double of the total marketed pounds of the producer
taken into account a 6 million pounds limit (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
2010g).
These programs can be regarded as direct payments, partly decoupled as limits on
quantity are set. They are put in place to support small scale producers.
2.2.5 Effect of Government Programs on Producer Price.
In an article by Manchester and Blayney (2001), the milk pricing system in the
U.S. is explained. Several programs, especially the FMMO, make this a complex
matter. Prices used to be very stable and farmers could rely on the federal Dairy
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Price Support Program that guaranteed farmers a basic price for their milk. The
only thing farmers had to take into account was which dairy gave more and which
extra benefits did the dairy offer. But since the nineties, prices became more
volatile. Farmers need now to incorporate risk management tools and rely on
futures, options and forward contracts in order to reduce price risk.

Firstly a distinction on the market has to be made between manufactured dairy
products and beverages. Manufactured dairy products are priced according to the
law of supply and demand. The market determines the price of the raw milk to
process these except when the federal dairy price support program is intervening.
Milk beverages however are priced differently. The minimum price for raw milk,
set by federal and state MMO to process Class I products, is determined by the
price of milk to process manufactured dairy products.
Looking at the share of milk used to supply manufactured dairy products, an
increase in cheese demand since the late seventies results in a share of 70% of the
total milk supply volume in 2007. This results in a close relationship between the
wholesale price of manufactured dairy products and the price of raw milk.
Dairy products have different components. A division between fat and non-fat
milk solids is made. Cheese production, for example, accounts for the use of 40%
of the butterfat and only 15% of the non-fat milk solids. When the demand of
cheese drops, more fat than non-fat solids have to find an alternative way to the
consumer. Also, there is a difference in demand according to regions. Dense
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populations demand more fluid milk which results in a higher share of Class I and
Class II milk marketing orders for those regions.

A small quantity of butter (only 1.7% of total butter production in 2007) is traded
by brokers on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 5 daily, except during
weekends and holidays. The price of the CME market is used as reference price
for selling butter throughout the U.S. The idea is that companies buy butter on the
CME if they cannot purchase it anywhere else for a certain price equal or lower
than the CME market price. However companies sell butter when they cannot sell
it at a certain price equal or higher then the CME market price. This concludes
that the CME market price is the real market value of butter. Cream and other
butter based products are tied to the CME butter price.
Also cheese is traded on the CME. 0.4% of all cheese production is traded on the
CME. Here the price is used also as the reference price of the cheese trade in U.S.
The price support program installs a minimum market price for these dairy
commodities.
The marketing orders have three purposes:
-

guarantee supply of milk beverages to consumers at a reasonable price

-

to create greater producer price stability

-

to create adequate producer grade A milk prices in order to guarantee a
certain production

5

The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) is an American financial and
commodity derivative exchange based in Chicago.
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They address these objectives by a classified pricing system and by revenue
pooling. These marketing orders are not obligatory, producers vote to approve
them. The milk marketing orders do not have an effect on the whole market,
however 70% of the grade A milk produced in the U.S. is regulated through the
program. 20% is regulated through the California milk marketing orders. The
orders regulate the milk plants, called handlers. The handlers are required to
account to the federal order pool at the established minimum class and component
prices. There are three types of handlers:
-

Distributing plants: processing, packaging and selling beverage milk
products within designated marketing areas.

-

Supply plants: carrying fluid milk reserves to supply other dairies for fluid
milk purposes. These plants are usually processing cheese and other dairy
products. However when there is a shortage of fluid milk they are obliged
to supply the distributing plants with fluid milk.

-

Cooperatives: These have several purposes like procuring milk, processing
milk, providing services to farmers like milk quality testing. The dairy
coops serve the milk marketing orders with efficiency contribution in the
dairy chain. These coops are not obliged to pay the farmers the minimum
class prices as coops are regarded as an extension of the farm. The coops
share their profits with their member-farmers. In order to attract suppliers
they need to pay-out a competitive price.

Classified pricing
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The milk price varies according to the product it is manufactured in. This
classified pricing system is set up by government (State of California or Federal)
to set minimum prices processors have to pay to farmers according to the use of
the fluid milk. The classified pricing system knows four classes:


Class I. Grade A milk used in all beverage milks.



Class II. Grade A milk used in fluid cream products, yogurts, or perishable
manufactured products (ice cream, cottage cheese, and others).



Class III. Grade A milk used to produce cream cheese and hard
manufactured cheese.



Class IV. Grade A milk used to produce butter and any milk in dried form.

The minimum prices show the minimum value of milk used to manufacture
products within a certain Class. The price for farmers is calculated differently
based on this classified pricing system.

The prices for Class II, Class III and Class IV are the same over the 10 different
orders, the price for Class I differs over these 10 orders. Minimum prices for
Class III and IV are announced in the beginning of the following month to which
they apply, minimum prices for Class I and II products are announced at the end
of the month prior to which they apply.

The formula used to set the minimum Class prices is of the following form:
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Component price/lb = (Product price/lb – Make allowance/lb)*Yield

The dairy product prices are based on monthly averages of the USDA‟s National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) weekly surveys of the wholesale prices for
Grade AA butter, block and barrel cheddar cheese, non-fat dry milk and dry whey.
The NASS collects weekly sales prices and reports every Friday the average
prices of the preceding week. The prices of Class III and Class IV products are
highly correlated with the CME prices of the preceding week. The correlation
between NASS prices and CME prices for butter has a value of R² 0.99 and for
cheese R² is 0.98. This confirms the use of CME prices as reference prices.
Make allowance are the assumed costs per pound to manufacture the dairy
product. The price of raw milk is not included. By subtracting the make allowance
price from the product price the value of the milk components is generated. The
higher the make allowance value the lower the value of the milk components. It is
important to balance this out as farmers will not supply the handlers if the
estimated value for the component price is too low and manufacturers will not
process milk anymore if the make allowance price is too low resulting in paying
out farmers a too high share of the value of the dairy product.
The yield factor indicates how many pounds of product can be made from a
pound of the associated milk component.

The following step to determine the Class III and IV prices is to link the skim
milk price to the component prices. This calculation requires standards for the
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skim milk composition according to the Class these are used for. A
hundredweight of Class IV skim milk is assumed to contain 9 pounds non-fat
solids and Class III skim milk is assumed to contain 3.1 pounds of protein and 5.9
pounds of other solids. The price of skim milk according to Class is calculated as
many times the component price as the component is present in the skim milk
used to manufacture the Class products. Raw milk is assumed to consist of 3.5%
butterfat and 96.5% of skimmed milk so in the last stage the skim milk price is
multiplied by the factor 0.965 and the butter by the factor 0.035 to calculate the
Class IV price. In essence the Class IV milk price is only depending on the NASS
calculation of the price of butter and the price of non-fat dry milk.

Class IV price/cwt = 4.2*NASS butter price/lb + 8.5982*NASS non-fat dry milk
price/lb – 1.847

The Class III price is calculated in a similar fashion which results in the following
formula:

Class III price/cwt = 9.6393*NASS cheese price/lb + 0.4199*NASS butter
price/lb + 5.8643*NASS dry whey price/lb -2.8189

The constants 1.847 and 2.8189 can be interpreted as the make allowance per
hundredweight to produce butter and respectively cheese.
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Class I and Class II milk prices are calculated in advance using data from the
previous month. The reason for that is that Class I and II dairy plants are
producing products that are traded quickly after procurement of the raw milk so
they need to know the cost of raw milk prior to selling their products to the retail
chain. The Class I and II prices are calculated with the same product price
formulas as the Class III price however using a different price for the
components; the previous month price. To calculate the Class I price an additional
aspect is involved. A Class I differential is added, based on the location of the
plant receiving the milk. Class I differentials are specific to the county of each
marketing area. This is to stimulate supply of fluid milk in areas where the
demand is high by compensating for the transportation cost.

Pooling
Handlers pay out their suppliers a uniform price. They pay in or take out of a
producer settlement fund according to the value of their milk receipts relative to
the average market value. Handlers‟ price obligation to their suppliers is at the
average market value. The value of their milk receipts is adjusted with a producer
price differential (PPD), a producer location adjustment, protein value, butterfat
value, other solids value and a somatic cell count adjustment. The PPD is a
measure of how much the average value of the handler‟s receipts over the entire
market exceeds the average value if all milk were priced at Class III. In other
words the value of the PPD calculates the excess value of products belonging to
other Classes than the Class III products relative to products of Class III. The
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PPDs are adjusted according to the county wherein the farmer produces. These
location adjustments are set by Congress to stimulate the supply of fluid milk
close to consumption areas.
In essence by pooling the revenues of different products, the milk marketing
orders provide farmers with an equal price, called the uniform price, regardless of
the purpose for their raw milk. So a farmer supplying a cheese plant gets the same
price for his milk as a farmer providing a fluid milk plant.

The price producers get at the end is the uniform price adjusted according to the
butterfat, other solids, protein content, the producer price differential, and the
number of somatic sells. However there are also other milk check components
that can be plant specific or uniform across all plants. Plant specific premiums are
often associated with milk characteristics like quality, producer characteristics
like volume premiums or can be the result of a higher efficiency of the plant and
their willingness to pay producers a higher price than the obliged uniform price
for Class I and Class II prices. Cooperatives organize marketing-agencies to
negotiate with the handlers for a higher price; the premium achieved is then called
a super-pool premium. A portion of the premium is used to cover the cost of this
negotiation process; the rest is paid out to the farmers. These super-pool
premiums can be controlled on state level as is the case in Pennsylvania.
2.3 Comparison of Policies Affecting the German and the U.S. Dairy Market.
Both markets are highly protected. There are many similarities in the policies to
regulate the U.S. and the EU/German dairy market.
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A first similarity is that both markets set base prices for dairy products. The base
prices for these dairy products result however in a milk price of 9.90 $/cwt,
approx. 218 $/t. The base price in EU is 215 EUR/t. When the price for certain
dairy products in the U.S. and the EU is below the benchmark price, intervention
occurs by government purchase of dairy products. In both countries criticism on
the support of certain dairy products is present as they temper product innovation.
The dairy industry is focusing more and more on consumer preference. This
involves that supporting commodities by government, as a mean to support
producer price, is not in line anymore with the current market developments
(International Dairy Foods Association, 2008).
An additional similarity is the presence of direct payments. In the EU the trend to
decouple the payments from production is present with already 87% of the
payments decoupled. In the U.S., these payments are partially decoupled due to a
cap on the total quantity eligible for a direct payment. Also it depends on the price
of the market if these payments occur or not. They can be seen as a safety net
generated to support farmers‟ income when milk prices are low, so called
countercyclical payments. In Germany however farmers get direct payments
regardless of the price on the market. They form an important share of the farm
income.
A third similarity is the presence of export support. This export support is
necessary for both countries to be competitive on the world market when world
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market prices are low 6. With rising world market prices for milk these export
subsidies are of little importance nowadays.
The main policies involving the dairy market in these two countries are different.
In Germany the quota system regulates the market highly and in the U.S. the Milk
Marketing Orders are of high importance. The quota system regulates the supply
by fixing quantity. The Milk Marketing Orders have as main consequences a
uniform base price for farmers and access to fluid milk nationwide for consumers.
The minimum price, however, is not fixed. It has a lower limit implemented
through the DPPSP and depends on the market price.
The MMO and the quota system in particularly influence the farmer-dairy
relationship. Dairies in the U.S. are obliged to pay the farmers a minimum price
based on the market price (cooperatives are exempt of this rule). In Germany the
quantity of milk produced is limited due to the quota system. This involves a
stable supply to the dairy from the farmers, quantity agreements are not necessary
to make (especially not in a coop-member relationship). Additionally, the
combination of the quota system, export subsidies and implementation of a base
price result in a stable price on the German dairy market which makes price
agreements between dairies and farmers less complicated. However, due to the
reduction of the impact of these policies, price fluctuations are more prominent
making a price agreement between both parties necessary in order to reduce price
risk.

6

During the price drop in 2009, as a consequence of reduced demand due to the
financial crisis, export subsidies and also intervention by purchase gained
importance.
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2.4 WTO and the Doha Round
During the Doha Round negotiations (2001-…) a reduction of protectionist
policies and the development to more open markets stood high on the agenda.
Due to particular interest of member countries, a full agreement is until today not
achieved. However, a framework for modalities for further agricultural
negotiations was reached in 2004 (Dobson, 2005). The framework includes
following three pillars:
-

Progress towards eliminating export subsidies

-

Increase market access

-

Reduce trade distorting domestic support

Under these trade negotiations the EU export subsidies and the U.S. DEIP
program will be abolished in time. The U.S. trade negotiators proposed in 2002 to
terminate the export subsidies five years after agricultural trade liberalization
measures became effective under the Doha Round, the French proposed a phaseout period until 2015 or 2017 (Dobson, 2005). The increase of market access will
be obtained by reducing tariffs. This holds especially for the U.S. where TRQs
regulate import. The WTO classifies domestic support in three boxes, i.e., the
Green, the Amber and the Blue box. The amber box contains all domestic support
measures considered to distort production and trade. The blue box contains
subsidy measures as described for the amber box, but the support demands
additionally to limit production. The Dairy Price Support Program is regarded as
the U.S. number one policy distorting trade. Countercyclical payments, as the
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MILC-program, are also regarded as amber box measures. In the framework, set
up in 2004, it was set that the amber box measures could not exceed 5% of the
value of a country‟s agricultural production during a base period to be negotiated
(Dobson, 2005). Green box measures are regarded as non-trade distorting and will
be accepted. The Single Farm Payments in the EU and other direct payments in
the U.S. are regarded green box measures. As the implementation of quotas only
makes sense in a closed market and is a blue box measure, the EU decided to
phase out its quota in order to prepare the players in the market for an open
market environment.

The effects of trade liberalization are discussed in many papers. Some of these
studies were discussed for the case of Germany with the abolishment of the quota
system (see section 2.1.1 Quota). In a study by Langley et al. (2003) it was found
that trade liberalization in the dairy market would result in a reduction of supply,
increase of the value of dairy traded and raise world prices. The higher world
prices are achieved due to a reduction in supply of highly subsidized regions as
the EU and the U.S. (3 to 6% decrease of production). The U.S. milk price is
predicted to decline over a range of 0.4% to 5% (Langley et al., 2003; Cox et al.,
1999); the price in Europe however is predicted to decline by 25% to 26%
(Langley et al., 2003; Cox et al., 1999). These studies predict a higher negative
impact for the EU dairy market than for the U.S. dairy market. The real impact of
liberalization depends on many factors as to which extent policies will be adapted,
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how the global demand will develop, how production structure will change and to
which extent free trade implies a higher competition on the market.
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3 Description of the Markets
Like any other market, the market for milk is determined by supply and demand.
As seen in Chapter 2 Dairy Policy, policies interfere with the market. Structural
policies shift supply or demand, while price policies only lower or raise the price
by means of a tax or subsidy. Many changes occurred on the production side of
the market. Farmers expand their business as an answer to price pressure. On the
processing side the same trend is observed. Due to increasing competition,
structural changes take place rapidly. The number of processing plants decreases,
while the capacity increases.
These changes are of course only possible due to the development of technology,
science and the access to capital. Adaptation to modern techniques increases the
profit margin for the early adaptor. Pressure on the price has as a consequence
that more businesses adapt, which results in the necessity of the implementation
of a new technology to induce a higher profit margin. This process is ongoing and
is called the technological treadmill. These new technologies induce a higher
production per cow and the possibility to manage larger herds. Increased
efficiency in combination with economies of scale makes modern farms more
competitive in comparison with small family farms. The same holds for dairies.
Implementation of new technologies makes it possible to increase the market and
increase the plant capacity. The possibility to share information directly, make it
possible to manage several plants regional, interregional or even international.
Demand is also a driving force for structural change. When demand increases,
opportunities rise on the market. Entry in the market is stimulated, as so is
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production by players already involved. When demand is decreasing the opposite
is true.
An additional factor is demonstrated by Sutton (1991). Sutton argues that in
addition to demand and technology changes, the characteristics of sunk costs7, the
characteristics of the product market and the willingness of firms to cut prices in
order to maintain market share are determining factors for the number of firms the
market can sustain. Sunk costs can either be endogenous or exogenous.
Exogenous sunk costs include fixed investment for plant and equipment, while
endogenous sunk costs include investment in research and development and
advertisement. Sutton shows some interesting relationships between the
concentration level and these variables. In homogeneous markets when sunk costs
are exogenous the level of concentration increases with price competition
toughness. However, it declines when the market size increases relative to the
amount of exogenous sunk costs. The same holds for a differentiated market; the
maximum number of firms increases as the market size increases. Sutton also
argues that an increase in endogenous sunk cost results in an increase of the
market and firm size. The main finding in this study is that the level of
endogenous sunk cost determines a lower bound of concentration on the market.
Increased endogenous sunk costs have as a consequence a rise in the lower bound
of market concentration. The higher the responsiveness of the consumer, the
higher the lower bound of equilibrium concentration levels in the industry. The
interaction between exogenous and endogenous sunk cost result in the rejection of
7

Sunk costs are costs that can only be used for one purpose. Investment in
milking machine is an example of sunk costs.
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the following statement: when market size rises, concentration levels drop.
Advertising industries counteract the decrease of concentration as a consequence
of lower exogenous sunk costs relative to the market size.
3.1 German Dairy Market
In order to describe the German dairy market, a closer look to trends in domestic
demand, trade, supply, raw milk price, farm structure and processing structure is
provided.
3.1.1 Demand
Figure 3-1 shows the per-capita consumption in Germany of various dairy
products. An overall slightly increase per-capita consumption of dairy products
over the last 13 years is noticeable. The consumption of cheese grew steadily and
is an important contributor to the overall consumption of milk. An increase of
consumption of hard cheese, soft cheese and sliced cheese, particularly feta and
mozzarella contributed to this trend. Also the consumption of curdled milk and
mixed milk products had a steady increase over the last years, with as main
contributor a 36% increase in consumption of yoghurt.
The per-capita consumption of butter shows a decreasing trend. In 1996 the
average German consumed 7.3kg butter while in 2000 this was reduced to 6.6kg.
Since 2005 the consumption of butter was 6.4kg. The consumption of butter in
Germany was stable over the last 9 years.
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The consumption of milk is stable, however slightly increasing the last 9 years
with 2008 and 2009 as the best years in that period with a per-capita consumption
level higher then 66kg milk.
The per-capita consumption in Germany may be increasing; the total amount of
the population is decreasing since 2005. Germany counted in 2009 around 82
million people. The decline in population is expected to continue as Germany has
an old population. Germany‟s population pyramid has a small base and a broad
top. The Statistical Office of Germany expects a decrease of the population to 6974 million by 2050 (Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 2006).
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Figure 3-1: Per-capita consumption of dairy products in Germany, 19962009.
Data: German Dairy Association (2011).
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Germany was a net exporter for fluid milk, skimmed milk powder (SMP), whole
milk powder and cheese in 2009. The country is a net importer for butter. 46% of
the German milk production is exported. Around 90% is exported within the EU;
the next biggest market is Asia that receives 5% of the total exports (German
Dairy Association, 2011). Cheese is highly exported to non-EU countries with a
value of 945,357 tonnes of export of cheese in 2009 to non-EU countries (German
Dairy Association, 2011). 2,461,480 tonnes of fluid milk were exported within the
EU. Cheese contributes to half of all imports. European specialty cheeses are the
largest part of this import (German Dairy Association, 2011). The trade balance
for German dairy products is shown in Figure 3-2. The importance of trade is
increasing over the last decades.
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Figure 3-2: Trade balance in volume milk equivalent for Germany for
selected years.
Data: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (2010).
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3.1.2 Supply
From January to March 2010 the milk deliveries in Germany decreased by 82,200
tonnes compared with the same period in 2009 (German Dairy Association, 2011).
Overall the milk production in Germany in 2009 came close to its allowed quota
but did not complete it. Two reasons could explain this. First of all the quota
could not be binding anymore for German production of milk. This involves a
zero quota rent and a farm gate price equal to the production cost. On the other
hand this slight underproduction could be a result of individual farm
underproduction due to the adverse risk attitude towards the super-levy.

Annual German national milk production
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Figure 3-3: Annual German national milk production.
Data: Germany, Federal Statistical Office (2010).

The production of milk was stable over the last ten years as shown in Figure 3-3.
According to the Federal Statistical Office Germany the total production in 1999
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was 28,334 thousand tonnes. In 2008 the total milk production in Germany was
28,656 thousand tonnes. In 2002 and 2006 the total milk production was slightly
lower than 28,000 thousand tonnes. The quantity delivered to dairies increased
from 94.5% to 96% for the years 1999 and 2008. In 2008 4% of the produced
milk was used in the farmers household, processed into farm butter and farm
cheese, fed, sold as certified milk, etc (Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 2010).

In a report of the EC on price volatility an increase in price variation in
international and EU commodity markets was mentioned (European Commission,
2010a). The price variation on the world market is higher than on the European
commodity markets. Figure 3-4 shows the price for raw milk in Germany. An
increase of price volatility over the last 10 years can be observed. The price
ranged over the period 1991-2009 between a minimum of 240 EUR/t in 2009 to
345 EUR/t in 2001. The standard deviation of the price over the period 1991-2009
is 25 EUR/t. The increased price volatility could be explained by a reduction of
protectionist policy measures.
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Figure 3-4: Producer price for milk in Germany.
Data: 1991-2008: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (2010);
2009: German Dairy Association (2011).

3.1.3 Structure of Production
Germany consists of several states called “Bundesländer”. Because of historical
reasons and environmental reasons, the dairy production and structure of the dairy
farms varies. Figure 3-4 shows a map of the different states in Germany and their
share to the national production of milk.
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Figure 3-5: Share of milk deliveries of German states in 2009.
(Hessen, Rheineland-Pfalz and Saarland; Niedersachsen and Bremen; Berlin
and Brandenburg; Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg together)
Data: German Dairy Association (2011).

Bayern is the major contributor to the total volume of milk deliveries in Germany.
26% of all milk deliveries come from Bayern. Also Niedersachsen is one of the
main producing areas with 17% of the milk deliveries. These two are also the
largest states, regarding the surface area and have a low population density,
177/km² and167/km² respectively, compared to the densely populated state
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 524/km². A shift of production from southern states to
northern states is observed the last years. This shift is made possible by trading
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quota in two regions. The 33rd quota auction that took place on April 2011 the
first confirmed this trend (Deutscher Bauernverband, 2011).

East Germany has an average of 179 cows per farm in 2005, while North
Germany counts 47 cows per farm and South Germany only 26 cows per farm.
Also noticeable out of the data presented in Table 3-1, is the evolution to a larger
herd per farm. This is a trend present in all producer milk markets as farmers try
to benefit from economics of scale. Due to high technology cost (milk machine,
specialized stable, feeding machine …) farmers try to spread the cost over a larger
production. The incentive to specialize the production process works hand in hand
with increasing production. However due to the milk quota farmers have a
disincentive to enlarge their herd as the cost of quota has to be taken into account.
Looking at the percentage change in herd size between the years 1999 and 2005
we see the highest increase for states in the North. The South and the East have
the same herd growth rate. Comparing herd sizes in 2005 with the sizes in 2008
gives a different result. Over this recent time interval states in the South have the
highest growth percentage. Saarland is leading with 20%, followed by Bayern
and Baden-Württemberg with respectively 12% and 11%. Rheinland-Pfalz and
Hessen have a lower recent herd growth rate around 5%. The growth rate in the
Northern states is around 10% except for Nordrhein-Westfalen where it is only
2%. A reason could be the high population density in this state which results in a
high competition for land and less opportunities for farmers to expand their farm.
The herd size for dairy farms in East Germany is declining more than 9%.
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Table 3-1: Number of milk cows per farm per state over period 1999-2008 in
Germany.
200 200 200 2008 Change 1999- Change 2005State
1999 1
3
5
* 2005
2008
Schleswig-Holstein
50 55 57 59 64
0.18
0.08
Niedersachsen
35 40 43 46 51
0.31
0.11
Nordrhein-Westfalen
30 35 37 41 42
0.37
0.02
North
36 41 44 47 N.A.
0.31
N.A.
Hessen
Rheinland-Pfalz
Baden-Württemberg
Bayern
Saarland
South

23
32
20
21
36
22

32 34
41 43
27 30
25 28
46 55
26 N.A.

0.39
0.28
0.35
0.19
0.28
0.18

0.06
0.05
0.11
0.12
0.2
N.A.

Brandenburg
MecklenburgVorpommern
Sachsen
Sachsen-Anhalt
Thüringen
East

187 196 202 223 202

0.19

-0.09

164
126
161
136
152

0.21
0.15
0.07
0.29
0.18

-0.18
-0.21
-0.09
-0.12
N.A.

Germany

27
37
23
23
42
24

172
129
163
143
157

29
39
24
23
44
25

179
138
167
149
164

199
145
172
176
179

164
115
157
155
N.A.

31 35 36 38 42
0.23
Data: German Dairy Association (2011).

0.13

Data*: Germany, Federal Statistical Office (2009).

The milk production per cow increased in Germany due to technological and
scientific innovations that go hand in hand with a more specialized production
system. The yearly production per cow rose from 5,510kg to 6,849kg over the ten
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year period of 1996-2006. This involves an increase of 24%, as shown in Figure
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Figure 3-6: Milk production per cow in Germany.
Data: German Dairy Association (2011).

In Figure 3-7 the change of the number of producers and the change of the
average herd size is graphed. The number of producers declined rapidly over the
period 1990-2006 with 62%. The herd size increased from 23 cows per farm to 38
cows. In 2010 the average herd size was 45 cows per farm (German Dairy
Association, 2011)
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Figure 3-7: Evolution of the number of producers and herd size in Germany
over the period 1990-2006.
Data: Wocken et al. (2008).

The amount of dairy farms in 2005 was 110.4 thousand. In 2007 this was 101.2
thousand (Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 2009). Over two years the number
of dairy farms decreased by 8.3%. Figure 3-8 shows that the decline occurs due to
the disappearance of smaller farms with a herd size below 100 cows. This offsets
the increase of dairy farms with herds larger than 100 cows. However the majority
of German dairy farms have a herd smaller than 100 cows. In 2005 36.6% of the
farms had a herd smaller than 20 cows, 41.7% had a herd between 20 and 49 cows,
17.3% had a herd between 50 and 99 cows while only 4.4% had a herd over a 100
cows. In 2007 these percentages were accordingly 35.4%, 40.7%, 18.8% and
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5.1%. The average production per farm increased from 114 tonnes in 1990 to 262
tonnes in 2006 (Wocken et al, 2008).
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Figure 3-8: Number of dairy farms in Germany according to the herd size.
Data: Germany, Federal Statistical Office (2009).

Figure 3-9 shows the relationship between production and size of the farm. Farms
with a herd size between 1 and 19 cows contribute little to the national production.
35% of the farms milk only 9% of the national herd. 41% of the farmers have a
herd size between 20 and 49 cows, good for 32% of the national herd. 24% have a
herd larger than 50 cows and they account for 58% of the national herd. Relating
production to number of cows, the percentage share of the national herd size gives
us an idea of the contribution to the national production. However, it must be said
that if we would use the percentage of the national production, we might see an
even higher share towards farms with a larger herd size, as these tend to have a
higher production per cow.
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Figure 3-9: Size structure-production relation for Germany in 2007.
Data: Statistische Jahrbuch (2009); German Dairy Association (2010b).

3.1.4 Processing Structure
The dairy industry in Germany is traditionally populated by small and mediumsize enterprises. However due to an increased competition on the market dairies
merge, form joint ventures, and divest. The two largest dairy cooperatives of
Germany, Nordmilch and Humana, merged their sales department in 2010 under
the new company NordContor. Both have a 50% share in the new company. This
merger involves around 30% of the German milk production (Wenk, 2009). Other
mergers on the market happened between Friesland Foods and Campina. These
two Dutch companies merged in 2009. The new company FrieslandCampina has a
market share of around 80% in the Netherlands and is an important player on the
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German market with a milk turnover of 983 million kilograms. A list of the
German processors is provided in Appendix 1. 70% of the milk produced in
Germany is procured by cooperatives, but they only have a share of 45% in the
processing market. In Germany a lot of bargaining cooperatives are present. They
sell the milk of member-farmers without actually procuring it. In 2007 139
bargaining cooperatives were present in Germany (Germany, Federal Ministry of
Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection, 2010). Out of Figure 3-10 we can
see also a decrease in the number of plants. In 1991 there were 508 plants, while
in 2006 there were 281 plants. Taking into account that these plants processed
35,083 million kilogram milk (Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture
and Consumer Protection, 2008), the average plant size for Germany is around
125 million kilogram of milk.
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Figure 3-10: Evolution of the number of dairy companies and plants in
Germany over selected years.
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Data: Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer
Protection (2008).

Of the 198 dairies that were processing milk in 2006, 39 did not procure milk
directly from farmers. 57 of the dairies were cooperatives, 141 were private
companies. The share of cooperative organized firms dropped from 43% in 1994
to 29% in 2006.

The cooperatives processed 45% of the total amount of

processed milk in 2006. Their share has been decreasing over time however only
with 10% from 55% to 45%. The average amount of milk processed per dairy is
177 million kg a year. An increase in size of the dairy companies is observable.
This follows out of the fact that the total amount of milk processed increases and
the number of companies decreases. Around 7.1% of the German dairies process
more than 500 million kg milk a year. However 50% of the dairies process less
than 50 million kg a year. Figure 3-11 provides a closer look at the structure of
the plants and the dairy companies. Only a relative small number of dairies have a
plant with a capacity larger than 300 million kg a year. The large plants represent
a large share of the processing, however a small share of the processors (Germany,
Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection, 2008).
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Figure 3-11: Size structure-production relationship for German dairies in
2006.
Data: Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer
Protection (2008).
The number of plants for processing certain dairy products is shown in Figure 312. The majority of the dairy firms are processing fluid milk and cheese. Also
butter is processed in 96 plants of the 281 plants in Germany. In total 36% of the
produced milk in Germany is used in the processing of fresh dairy products, from
which 40% is fluid milk. 30% is used to make butter, 22% is used to make cheese
(German Dairy Association, 2010b).
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Figure 3-12: Number of plants for selected dairy products for 1994-2006 in
Germany.
Data: Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer
Protection (2008).

Consolidation in the German market is present and is continuing. Fewer firms
control an increasing share of the milk procurement and processing. In 2006, only
five dairy companies processed 36% of the total market volume. This trend seems
to be stronger among cooperatives then private firms. The average size of
cooperatives was in 1994 134.1 million kg/year, in 2006 this was more then
doubled to an amount of 280.9 million kg/year. Private firms are smaller with an
average size increase of 30% to 135.2 million kg in 2006 compared to 1994
(Germany, Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection, 2008).
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3.2 U.S. Dairy Market
In order to describe the U.S. dairy market, a closer look at trends in domestic
demand, trade, supply, raw milk price, farm structure and processing structure is
provided.
3.2.1 Demand
Since the 1970s the per-capita consumption rose slightly (Gould, 2010). In Figure
3-13 the per-capita consumption of various dairy products is shown over the
period 1990 to 2009. The most important contributor to this growth is cheese
consumption. The per-capita cheese consumption doubled in the last three
decades and shows no sign of a weakening demand. This increase of cheese
consumption can be explained by a wider variety of cheeses, an increase in outdoor eating and a greater popularity of ethnic food that has cheese as a main
ingredient. Fluid milk and frozen dairy products dropped in recent decades. A
drop in fluid milk consumption can be explained by the higher competition level
it faces on the market from other beverages. Evaporated and condensed milk and
dry dairy products consumption also decreased. Consumption of butter has been
steady since the early 1970s (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2004). In the
FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2011 8 , per-capita consumption of fluid milk is
estimated to keep on decreasing over the next years, while consumption of cheese
8

“The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute is a unique, dualuniversity research program, established in 1984 by a grant from the U.S.
Congress, to prepare baseline projections for the U.S. agricultural sector and
international commodity markets and to develop capability for policy analysis
using comprehensive data and computer modeling systems of the world
agricultural market.” (Food and Agricultural Research Institute, 2011)
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is expected to keep on increasing. Consumption of butter and non-fat dry milk is
projected to be stable (Food and Agricultural Research Institute, 2011).
Next to the per-capita consumption, the total population in the U.S. is also
increasing. In 2010 the U.S. counted approx. 309 million Americans. In a report
from the U.S. Census it was projected that the U.S. population would keep on
increasing in the future (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The population pyramid of
the U.S. has a broad base and a small top. The U.S. has a relatively young
population compared to Germany. This will result in an increase of the domestic
demand.
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Figure 3-13: Per-capita consumption of dairy products in U.S., 1990-2009.
Data: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2011a).

Figure 3-14 shows the trade balance of dairy products for the U.S. The U.S. is a
net exporter for dairy products. Since 2003 the net export level increased sharply
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resulting in a positive net value for trade of dairy products in 2007. An increase of
trade in dairy products is expected to continue as protectionist policies like the
TRQs are reduced and export is stimulated with a rising world market price for
dairy products. Overall, the share of milk exported is small, i.e. around 9% in
2008. Cheese is the main imported product in the U.S. The main exported product
is non-fat dry milk.
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Figure 3-14: Trade balance in volume milk equivalent for U.S. for selected
years.
Data: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (2010).

3.2.2 Supply
With increasing consumption and increasing net exports the creation of an
increasing demand occurs. The supply answered as shown in Figure 3-15. In the
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period 2004-2008 milk production quantities increased rapidly to approx. 86
million tonnes in 2008. This trend follows the general trend since the 1980s of an
increase in production (Gould, 2010). An increase in production from the 1980s to
2008 is partly due to a higher price as consequence of a higher demand and
government support.
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Figure 3-15: Annual U.S. national milk production.
Data: Gould (2010).

The producer price for milk is shown in Figure 3-16. The price in the U.S. rose
over the period 1991-2008, and varied between 269 $/t in 2002 to 450 $/t in 2008.
An increase of price fluctuation is noticeable over the last years. The standard
deviation of the price over the period 1991-2008 is 51 $/t. In 2009, a major price
drop occurred partially due to a reduced demand due to the financial crisis. The
increased price volatility occurs, as the U.S. dairy policy changes reduce the
protection rate, which makes the market more vulnerable to fluctuations on the
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world market. Noticeable is also the cyclical price fluctuations. This can be
explained by the cobweb theorem (Keane et al, 2009). When there is a lag
between production and price change, cyclical variations in price and production
occur. The MILC-program and Cooperatives Working Together-program (CWTprogram; see Appendix 2) are programs established to deal with these cyclical
variations.
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Figure 3-16: Producer price for milk in the U.S.
Data: United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (2010).

3.2.3 Structure of Production
There is a lot of regional variability in milk production in the U.S. Milk is
produced in all 50 states, however the amount of production and the organization
of the dairy farms changes between states. The top ten states in milk production in
2009 were (Gould, 2010):
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 California (20.9%)
 Wisconsin (13.3%)
 New York (6.6%)
 Idaho (6.4%)
 Pennsylvania (5.6%)
 Minnesota (4.8%)
 Texas (4.7%)
 New Mexico (4.2%)
 Michigan (4.2%)
 Washington (2.9%)

Figure 3-17 shows the distribution of milk cows in the U.S. in 2007. There is a
high presence of milk cows around the Great Lakes States, like Wisconsin and
Michigan, at the North East Coast States, like New York and Pennsylvania and in
Western Coast States, like California and Washington. The relative importance of
the Western areas has grown over the last years due to beneficial organizational
and climatic reasons.
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Figure 3-17: Milk cow distribution U.S. 2007.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2009).
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Figure 3-18 shows the share of dairy farms in several USDA Farm Production
Regions.

Figure 3-18: Percentage of total dairy farms in the U.S. 2007.
Source: University of Massachusetts (2010).

Taking into account Figure 3-17, one can derive an idea about the farm size in the
different production areas. The Pacific area contains only 5 percent of the dairy
farms while this area contains two states that are in the top ten of dairy production
as mentioned before. The average size of farms in this region is relatively high, i.e.
more than 500 cows. A high share of the number of dairy farms is observed
around the Great Lakes and the North East Coast. These are also the main dairy
producing areas but the farm size is relatively smaller than in the Pacific area.
An evolution of changing structure of dairy farms from small scale dairy farms
towards large scale dairy farms is noticeable in the U.S. dairy scene (Blayney,
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2002). This translates in fewer farms with a higher production capacity. Between
1970 and 2006 the number of dairy farms (i.e. farms who have dairy production
present, this does not exclude farms who have as main income some other
activity) fell from 648,000 to 75,000. This consists in a drop of 88.4% over a 36
year-span. Also during that period the total amount of dairy cows in the U.S.
dropped from 12 million to 9.1 million. This results in an increase of average
number of cows per farm from 18.5 in 1970 to 121.3 in 2006. This evolution is
illustrated in Figure 3-19 (MacDonald et al., 2007).

Figure 3-19: Evolution of the number and size of dairy farms in the U.S.
Source: MacDonald et al. (2007).

Nowadays, the size of the dairy farms varies from over 15,000 cows to just a few
cows. The average size of the U.S. dairy farms is between 50 and 100 cows. 23%
of the dairy farms have a herd larger than 100 cows with a production share of
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79.6% and 47% of the farms have a herd smaller than 50 cows with a production
share of 6.1% (MacDonald et al., 2007). Figure 3-20 shows the size structureproduction relationship. It is obvious that the „percent of operation‟ is skewed to
the left while the „percent of production‟ is skewed to the right. Farms with a herd
over 2000 cows have a production share of 23.4% while this entails only 0.7% of
total operations. These numbers refer to the situation in 2006.
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Figure 3-20: Size structure-production relation of the U.S. dairy farms in
2006.
Data: MacDonald (2007).

However, it must be noticed that large dairy farms and small dairy farms are
organized in different ways. Small dairy farms tend to breed their heifers on farm
and tend to use own farm grown feed, while larger farms buy feed and contract
with other operations to raise their heifers. Large farms keep there herd usually in
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large barns or drylot feed yards while small farms tend to pasture their cattle.
Both types of farms are family owned but the labor provided on large farms is
mostly hired labor, as compared to a small farm with family labor.

The milk production per cow in the U.S. rose with 41 % over the period 1991 to
2010. The average yield per cow in 2010 was 9,593 kg. Figure 3-21 shows this
evolution. The dairy herd retirement program, implemented by the organization
CWT, could enhance the increase of average production per cow, as the less
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Figure 3-21: Milk production per cow in the U.S.
Data: Gould (2010).
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productive are the first to be eliminated through the program.

3.2.4 Processing Structure
In a paper of the USDA structural changes in the dairy industry are discussed
(Ollinger et al., 2005). The study explains how due to technological changes the
processing structure in the U.S. changed drastically. Plant size grew while the
number of plants dropped. This evolution is shown in Figures 3-22 and 3-23. In
the processing market, three types of organizations are engaged, i.e. dairy
cooperatives, supermarkets and convenience store chains, and large proprietary
dairy companies. None of them escaped the consolidation. The fluid milk
processing structure underwent major changes. The implementation of cool trucks,
replacing glass bottles by plastic bottles and having consumers go to the shop to
buy milk all contributed to an increase in plant size and a reduction of the number
of plants. In the 1930s cooperatives played an important role in the fluid milk
market. Nowadays, they only control around 7% of this market. In the 1970s
supermarkets played an important role in manufacturing fluid milk. However, due
to low profits, they sold their plants. Nowadays the role of large proprietary
companies in fluid milk processing is of particular interest. Dean Foods, the U.S.
number one dairy company (see Appendix 1) accounted for 35% of the fluid milk
market after a merger with Suiza Inc. in 2001. Land O‟Lakes, a dairy cooperative
mainly active in the dairy belt and California, sells around 40% of all the U.S.
butter (Land O‟Lakes, 2011). In the cheese processing industry cooperatives have
a share of 40%.
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Most of the farmers‟ milk is procured by cooperatives. In 1992, 82% of the U.S.
raw milk was handled by cooperatives, 68% of the cooperatives were bargaining
only coops. Of all milk marketed by cooperatives in 1992, 43% was processed in
owned plants; in 2002 this was reduced to 38% (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
2005a). Dairy Farmers of America, the U.S.‟s largest dairy cooperative with
18,000 members, procures around one third of the U.S. milk production (Dairy
Farmers of America, 2011a). Dean Foods and DFA have an agreement that all
milk supplied to Dean Foods is procured by DFA. Such an agreement raises
questions about the market power of these two companies towards consumers and
producers. Consolidation in the U.S. dairy industry is an important factor to the
structural change. Consolidation happens among the proprietary firms as well as
among the cooperatives. The share of large cooperatives and large proprietary
firms9 of the total U.S. dairy sales changed from 16.9% and 39.3% respectively
in 1975 to 26.9% and 42.2% in 1998 (Blayney et al., 2000).

The number of plants declined drastically during the last decades. Figure 3-22
shows the decline of plants for several dairy products. In 2008 the total number of
manufacturing plants in the U.S. was 1,178 and the number of milk bottling plants
was 319. Wisconsin has the largest number of manufacturing plants, i.e. 211. New
York counts 112 plants and California 107 plants (Schultz, 2010). It must be
noticed that the number of manufacturing plants increased over the last few years.
This increase is due to an increase of cheese processing plants. From 2008 to
9

Minimum sales for a large firm changed from 250 million dollars in 1975 to 800
million dollars in 1998 (Blayney et al., 2000).
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2009 45 new cheese plants were in operation. In 2009 32 new plants were opened
in the state of Texas. An increase of plants in North Atlantic states like Vermont
and Pennsylvania was also present the last few years (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2010/NASS). The amount of fluid milk bottling plants decreases, in
2004 there were still 367 milk bottling plants. A continuous increase of plant size
combined with the possibility to transport milk in cooling tanks could explain this
trend.
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Figure 3-22: Number of plants for selected dairy products in U.S., 1970-2004.
Data: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2011b).

The plant size in U.S. grew rapidly to 94 million kg in 2004 as shown in Figure 323.
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Figure 3-23: Evolution of plant size in U.S. for selected years.
Graph based on the milk equivalent of the production of cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk and fluid milk in U.S. plants for selected years.
Data: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2011b); Bailey (1997).
3.3 Comparison
The demand for American as well as German milk increases due to an increase in
domestic demand and also an increase in the international demand. The supply
increases accordingly. However, this increase in supply is stronger in the U.S.
This can be explained due to the effect of the quota system that limits a supply
response in Germany. The U.S. has a younger population than Germany.
Increasing population in U.S. will result in an increasing domestic demand which
is of high importance for the U.S. dairy industry. The German dairy industry is
less dependent on the domestic demand. An increase in international demand can
offset the decreasing domestic demand as a result of the population decrease.
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Both producer markets show a trend to fewer producers that produce more. In
absolute figures, calculated from the data above for the year 2006, the U.S. dairy
producers are larger in scale with an average herd size of 121 cows and an
average production of 1,093 tonnes compared to 41 cows and 272 tonnes for
German producers. The difference between farm structures is greater in the U.S.
than in Germany. In the U.S. around 1% of producers produce around 25% of the
national production, while in Germany 5% produces around 26% of the national
production (see Figures 3-9 and 3-20). The increased yield per cow indicates
specialization in the milk production, a higher yield results in lower cost of
production. The U.S. cows have far larger yields than German cows, approx. 31%
in 2006. This could be due to the breed choice (in Bayern a breed for meat as well
as milk production is common), the use of milk stimulating hormones (bovine
somatotropin; permitted to use in U.S., not in Germany), intensive breeding,
balanced feeding, and other production related parameters.
Both markets have regional differences of production. This results in
heterogeneity among farmers. The northeast of the U.S. has smaller farms
compared to states like California and Texas. The same for Germany exists;
Bayern has smaller farms than states in East and North-Germany. However,
Bayern has the largest share of production state wise in Germany, in the U.S.
California has. This can be explained with the policy measures influencing the
markets in both countries. The quota and direct payments temper the trend to
more specialized production, resulting in protecting less efficient farmers in the
state of Bayern. Quota contributes to maintain territorial spreading of milk
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production (European Court of Auditors, 2009). In the U.S., the MMOs provide
farmers with a uniform price. The location adjustment of the PPD also stimulates
the production of fluid milk in counties further from the market. The MMOs have
an effect that production is stimulated nation wide; however farmers that have a
lower cost of production are able to overcome periods of low market prices. The
trend of milk production shifting to states where a lower cost for production is
achieved, such as Texas and California, is however prominent (Gould, 2010;
Blayney, 2002). In Germany a similar trend is observable, with a shift of share of
the national production to the Northern States, made possible by the two region
auction of quota.
In the processing sector structural changes also took place. In both countries the
number of processing plants declined as well as the number of dairies while the
plant size increased. In Germany, the average plant size is larger than in the U.S.
In recent years an increase of the number of plants in the U.S. is observed. This
can be explained due to an increase in demand, especially for cheese products.
Cooperatives play in both countries an important role in the procurement of raw
milk. Coops procure more than 70% of the market, though process less then 50%.
This indicates the role of cooperatives in the market as bargaining cooperatives.
In the U.S. the processing role of coops is of relative less importance as the
amount of milk processed by coops is 38% of the total milk marketed by them in
2002. Plants are clustered in regions with a high production traditionally (Bayern,
Wisconsin). A shift of plants to regions where milk production is becoming
important is observable, especially in the case of Texas. In Germany the main
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players on the market invest in plants in East Germany, an area with a lower
density of plants (Friedrich, 2010).
In an article of the International Dairy Foods Association10 (2011) the position of
the dairy industry towards future prospects is described. The main focus of the
dairy industry until now was on the domestic market providing commodities such
as non-fat dry milk, butter and cheddar cheese. This was stimulated by
government due to the Dairy Product Price Support Program. With the reduction
of the intervention prices and a rise of the world market price, international
markets are accessible for the U.S. dairy industry. The importance of trade
increases. Also the market gets more and more consumer oriented. The dairy
industry develops new products oriented on consumer demand. The development
of new products is not stimulated by government as support was only given to
commodities. The Federal Milk Marketing Orders are regarded as out of date as
they provide minimum prices based on calculations with the prices for
commodities. The German dairy industry developed similarly. Compared with
other European players investment in innovation to create new products fell
behind. Though, in the period 2003-2008 Nordmilch, one of Germany‟s leading
dairy cooperatives, invested EUR400 million in restructuring the company to be
more oriented on high value added products (Nordmilch, 2011a). With a
reduction of the dairy market supporting measures, dairy companies adapt to new
demand markets, i.e. consumer preference driven and international markets

10

The International Dairy Foods Association represents the U.S. dairy
manufacturing and marketing industries and their suppliers.
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instead of the demand of government. The dairy industry seems to have taken the
challenge and restructure in both countries. On the farmers side though, the U.S.
farmers are far ahead of German farmers to produce at low cost.
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4 Cooperatives on the Dairy Market
The cooperative structure of dairies is important as many dairies seem to be
organized into a cooperative. 60-70% of all German milk is purchased by dairy
coops (Schlecht and Spiller, 2009), in U.S. 83% of farmers milk was marketed
through dairy cooperatives in 1991 (Jacobsen and Cropp, 1995), in 2007 this
share increased to even 86% (International Dairy Foods Association, 2011). In
Appendix 1, a list of the top 20 dairy companies in Germany and the U.S.,
according to processing quantity and product sales respectively, is presented. In
Germany 10 dairies listed are coops, in the U.S. 7 are. However it must be noticed
that the sales accounted for do not include the trade of raw milk from one dairy to
another. This results in lower sales for bargaining cooperatives like Dairy Farmers
of America that markets approximately one third of the U.S. milk production. The
leading processor in Germany is the cooperative Nordmilch, in U.S. the publically
traded company Dean Foods is the number one. The stronger competition on the
market forces cooperatives to adapt in order to stay competitive. The
organizational structure of the cooperatives is changing, which makes them able
to adapt to new strategies. In this section only cooperatives are discussed as they
are the major procurers of farm milk in both countries.
4.1 Changing Reasons to Cooperate
There is a vast literature available on cooperative transformation. The main idea
of cooperative transformation is to adapt to market changes. Cooperatives need to
adapt their strategies and organization in order to eradicate the traditional
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cooperative problems 11 also called the cooperative baggage. Cook developed a
dynamic theory of cooperative transformation in which he provides five stages of
transformation (Cook, 1995). In this theory Cook shows how a cooperative adapts
due to changing market conditions. He argues that a cooperative is founded to
deal with low prices and market failures12. As the economic environment changes
cooperatives have three options at the end of the ride, i.e. turn into an IOF,
continue, or transform into a value added marketing cooperative also called New
Generation Cooperative. Cook and Iliopoulos develop five characteristics of the
New Type Cooperative. These characteristics are implemented to reduce the
effect of the traditional cooperative baggage. The characteristics are; transferable
equity shares, appreciable equity shares, defined membership, legally binding
delivery contracts and minimum up-front equity investment requirement (Cook
and Iliopoulos, 1999).
Cooperatives were originally founded for five reasons according to van Dijk:
 Create market power to countervail monopoly power of IOF.
 Get access to industrial input factors (goods and services). Important is the
access to credit at favorable interest rates because this is a highly
influential factor in the development of agriculture. In the case of dairy

11

A summary of the classical cooperative problems is provided in Appendix 3.
Market failures are present because of three reasons according to Bijman and
Hendrikse (2003); asymmetric market power between processor and farmer,
incomplete and asymmetric information between the processor and farmer and
investment related transaction costs in the processor-farmer relationship (risk of
being held up by the processor is high when the product traded is perishable and
the sunk costs are relatively high compared with the total costs).
12
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farmers, milk testing and animal feed are examples of services and goods
provided.
 Efficiency by economics of scale (bulk goods). Accumulation of supply
generates accumulation of demand that results in more competition.
 Risk management. The risk to be cheated on the market is lower when the
co-operative deals with the farmer‟s products. This is because there is
solidarity between the members of the cooperative and there is trust in the
cooperative to obtain a fair price. This results in less risk and makes
investment decisions easier.
 Improvement of members‟ income and rural economy. The common
mechanism to improve income is to implement supply control by the
cooperative.
(Nilsson et al., 1997)

Due to the changing market environment in the last years, the five classical
reasons to create a cooperative transformed.
The first reason of obtaining countervailing market power changed by the concept
of the cooperative as an interface between the complex, specialized and
globalized food industries and the regional farms. Coops have to compete on this
market where competition is strong. They are part of the vertical chain with high
market power downstream. Coops are not suppliers of the local market anymore;
instead they are players in this dairy marketing chain.
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The second reason is transformed also due to the operation of highly sophisticated
input providers. Dairy coops provide farmers with services that have regional
specificity. In that way cooperatives are more regional bounded than IOF. The
new characteristic of the second reason is the provision of a well working network
between members and the cooperative to provide the efficient service of
management to farmers.
The new element to the third reason is the system integrated production since the
demand of consumers changed to products that offer variety, quality and
convenience at low cost. To implement the expensive and complicated
technologies at farm level to provide these new products, the cooperative plays a
new role.
The changing market conditions have changed the risk profiles of cooperatives
and their members. There are high risks involved with the expansion of the
cooperatives. Expansion realized by vertical integration and the creation of value
added products and by geographical market share. On the other hand it reduces
also the risks since value added products have a higher margin and benefits are
more secure. To manage risk new structures are set up within the cooperatives.
In the dairy sector the fifth reason keeps on playing an important role. In the U.S.
the Cooperatives Working Together (CWT) deals with supply control. When the
prices on the market are too low, CWT buys cows of farmers according to bids
and slaughters them in order to adjust supply and induce an increase of the price
(see Appendix 2). In Germany however, the improvement of income through
dairy coops is of limited effect. Associations like Deutsche Milchviehhalter
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Verband and on European level the European Milk Board, try to represent farmers
through unifying the voice of dairy farmers towards the policy makers. The
leading milk cooperatives in Germany have as strategy to improve farmers‟
income through becoming an important player on the market, which can raise
some concerns thinking about the first transformed reason.

The transformation of the five classical reasons to cooperate gave rise to the
description of the sixth reason to cooperate by van Dijk.
The sixth reason to set up a cooperative involves the need for new member
strategies as a consequence of the transformation of the five historical reasons. It
involves the necessity of creating new market opportunities under the conditions
of investor-driven membership, diversified membership and market fragmentation
(Nilsson and van Dijk, 1997). These new market opportunities must be created so
members of the cooperative have the opportunity to add value to products with
the use of their production factors. In essence, the sixth reason is the combination
of all five historical reasons but in a state of flux. That is because the market
situations nowadays are not static or slowly changing but also constantly
changing. Constant adaptation and innovation is thus required and the cooperative
function is to guide farmers in this process.
4.2 Cooperative Strategies
Three strategies are adopted by cooperatives according to Nilsson and Ohlsson
(2007) as a consequence of the changing market conditions.

77

Differentiation strategy:
Due to changing market conditions, such as growing competition due to the
liberalization of agricultural markets, increasing retail power and changing
consumer preferences (increasing diversification of demand) cooperatives change
their market strategies.
A first reaction of cooperative governances is the so called differentiation strategy
(Porter, 1998). Using this strategy, competition is avoided by offering different
products than their competitors. Cooperatives provide the consumers with what
they demand instead of just marketing what their producers supply. This strategy
demands investment in research and development and advertisement. Investing in
member farmers to supply milk with a certain quality (characteristics, like omega3 containing milk) and quantity can also result in offering a value added product.
To obtain heterogeneity in milk supply, a differential treatment of members may
be required. This implies a gradual shift in the power balance from the
membership to the management (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007). Differential
treatment of members results in a more complex governance which in turn makes
it harder for member farmers to control or direct management (Nilsson and
Ohlsson, 2007).
Also due to the high investment requirement to differentiate the products
produced by the coop, governance problems and capital problems can occur.
Collective investment by members is undesired as some members are unsure to
benefit their investment. Also with large investments trust in the management is
important as they have control over the decision in which projects will be invested.
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In order to meet this need for capital, cooperatives that follow the differentiation
strategy change their organizational structure to a more entrepreneurial form.
External financers are invited as co-owners, either in the cooperative itself or in
some subsidiaries which are devoted to far-reaching processing. Financial
instruments are implemented in order to make members‟ investment voluntary
and with an ownership entitlement for the appropriate capital returns. This
induces also a higher level of control on the management as the investors are keen
to know that their capital is wisely used.

Focus strategy:
The focus strategy entails the concentration of the production of a product that is
different of the product of competitors. By using this strategy a coop tries to target
a specific market so they can dominate this market segment. This strategy is also
capital intensive though less than the differentiation strategy as the product range
is narrower and the market segments fewer. The farmers have individual
ownership to their money and have strong control over the cooperative. They
accept supply and quality rules put on by the cooperative and are willing to make
large investments in the coop.

Overall cost leadership strategy:
This is the strategy followed by traditional coops. By being cost effective and
reaping the economies of scale, the coop competes on the market of
undifferentiated dairy products like whole milk, butter and cheese. This strategy
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needs access to the possibility to enlarge the milk volume processed. In order to
obtain that there is open membership, delivery rights, per member votes and other
traditional coop principles. The collectively owned equity capital is used to make
new investments and to pay out members a higher price. This gives members an
incentive to produce more as it also attracts new members which results in a
higher volume processed by the coop. Equal rights for all members is also
appealing for member candidates.
4.3 Cooperative Organization
Organizational theorists have found that an organization‟s structure is linked to its
strategy (Miles et al., 1978). Also writers on cooperative organization say that
cooperatives tend to follow different organizational principles depending on their
market conditions (Nilsson, 2001). Changing market conditions through to the
deregulation of the dairy market induces a change in the organizational structure
of the dairy cooperatives (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007).

Cooperatives have undergone a transformation over time. They used to have all
more or less the same structure with characteristics as collectively financing,
collectively governing and equal treatment of the members. This gave rise to
several problems a cooperative had to deal with in order to be competitive on the
market. To keep up with the competition level induced by IOFs, the cooperatives
modified their organizational form. Today, agricultural coops have external equity
capital, financial instruments which allow members to invest voluntarily, closed
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membership. Also cooperatives evolve to have a differential treatment of their
member-farmers (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007).

Due to these transformations, classifications are made for cooperatives. Nilsson
and Ohlsson (2007) divide cooperatives in two main groups: traditional coops and
entrepreneurial coops. The differences between them are based on the degree of
collectivism versus the degree of individualism in various dimensions as in
financial, governance and transactional dimensions.
According to van Bekkum and van Dijk (1997), Nilsson and Ohlsson (2007) show
how these three dimensions can be expressed. In Table 4-1 an overview is given.
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Table 4-1: Collective vs. individualized attributes according to cooperative
organizational structures.

Source: Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007.

The change in organizational structure makes the adaptation of different strategies
possible. A relationship between organizational structure and strategy is given in
Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2: Connections between the organizational models and the strategies
of agricultural cooperatives.

Source: Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007.

The division made in this table is not binding, different strategies and the different
organizational models can be combined. Many successful traditional coops apply
a differentiation strategy. This is so because other factors can explain the success
of a certain organizational coop with a specific market strategy. The factors can
pertain to the capital problem, for example the assets used in non-core business
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activities can increase in value so capital is available to invest in core business
activities and another reason can be that the coop is so dominant at a specific
market that it enjoys success even though it does not fit in a box in Table 4-2.
Other factors can reduce the governance problems, for example the members can
be satisfied with a specific cooperative model and also the managers of the coop
can be very skilled and motivated so to reduce the necessity of control by the
members. A last factor is the characteristics of its members. If the members are
not competitive on the market so thus cannot produce at low cost, the coop cannot
be competitive as well (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007).

The sixth reason of cooperation as described above is adopted by Entrepreneurial
Cooperatives or also called New Generation Cooperatives. They have two
characteristics. The first is that their major focus is on value added processing.
With doing this they are more focused on the consumer and they try to get higher
margins. The other characteristic is to step away from open membership. Tradable
and appreciable shares are established and they are linked with delivery rights.
Democracy is maintained as much as possible. The cooperative gets more profit
oriented, and these profits are distributed on the basis of share capital.
Confronted with this sixth reason, cooperatives evolve in two ways. They convert
into an IOF or the cooperative memberships are strengthened. Strengthening of
the memberships occurs especially in situations were the dependency of members
and the cooperative is high. An increased dependency results out of more risk in
the market. With a decrease in protectionism with as result a more fluctuating
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price, the dependency of farmers and dairies increases, farmers are more
dependent on a stable price and dairies are more dependent on a stable supply.
4.4 Three Prominent Strategies among Large Cooperatives
Three prominent strategies can be observed comparing the strategies of the large
cooperatives in the U.S. and Germany, which are the focus on production of value
added products, merging and internationalization.
The focus on value added products is a differentiation strategy as well as a focus
strategy. Mergers and joint ventures made it possible for some major players to
exist on the market. They are of importance as they are geographically strong on
the market and have a large share of the market. Internationalization is another
strategy adapted more recently. With the expansion of the European Union, West
European dairies invest in East European countries. With rising income for people
in Asian countries, foreign direct investments by western dairies are seen as a
good strategy. Both these strategies can be seen as overall cost leadership
strategies. Internationalization is also a differentiating strategy, not in the sense of
product differentiation, but market differentiation. By investing in a foreign
market the dairy can reduce the risk it incurs by dealing with an unfavorable
exchange rate and the risk of natural hazards is also reduced.
These three strategies are of increasing importance due to the reduction of
protectionist policies which increases international competition. By applying
these strategies the dairy cooperative strengthens its position and presence on the
market.
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4.4.1 Value Added Products
Cooperatives are traditionally processing their milk in commodities as
government was providing a base price for these products. However, as this
support price is decreasing due to changes in policy (ref. Chapter 2: Dairy Policy),
the cooperatives see the opportunity in the production of value added products.
Creating value to products demands investment in research and development.
Also investment in advertisement is important as the generated value has to be
promoted in order to be able to ask a higher price for the product. This strategy is
thus capital intensive and highly consumer oriented.
4.4.2 Mergers and Joint Ventures
Mergers between processors on the dairy market have been an important strategy
to increase market power. Two reasons for mergers are observed; to create
countervailing bargaining power for the concentrated retail sector downstream
and to lower cost of production (increase efficiency) to compete with rivals. For
the U.S. dairy processors, the major strategy to grow is through mergers and
acquisitions. Additional capacity and volume were usually available at lower cost
by acquisition than by building new capacity and competing for sales (Manchester
and Blayney, 1997).
Also Germany knew a wave of mergers by dairy processors (Tozanli, 1998). One
of the latest mergers announced on the German market is one between the Danish
cooperative Arla Foods and the North German cooperative Hansa-Milch
Mecklenburg-Holstein eG in early 2011. The new entity will be called Hansa Arla
Milch eG (Arla Foods, 2011).
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Mergers and acquisition of production facilities have been followed up by
government, i.e. by the Department of Justice in the U.S. and by the
Bundeskartellamt in Germany. Also the European Commission is investigating
mergers as some have a transnational impact. In Appendix 4 the investigation of
the EC on the merger between Friesland Foods and Campina is discussed. The
method applied to define the relevant markets is of major importance to evaluate
the effects of mergers. In 2003 a hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate took place regarding monopsony issues in agriculture in the
U.S. (U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 2003). A deeper discussion on
monopsony power and competition is provided in Chapter 5.

Joint ventures are also a way to increase market power by unifying resources.
However it is also a tool to reduce the companies risk and transfer it to the partner.
A joint venture between two dairies can be an agreement to use the facilities of a
coop by the other dairy but also the obligation to use the coops‟ members‟ milk in
these facilities. In that way the coop reduces its risk of marketing and processing
the milk and the other dairy can enlarge its market share towards the retail sector.
The agreement between DFA and Dean to provide all fluid milk by DFA to
Dean‟s plants and merging the sales departments of Nordmilch and Humana are
examples of joint ventures.
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4.4.3 Internationalization
Buccola et al. (2001) mentioned three reasons for agricultural cooperatives to
internationalize, i.e. increasing the firm‟s market share, enhancing average sale
price and reducing or diversifying risk. The major problem for agricultural
cooperatives to internationalize is the capital problem (Donoso, 2002).

In a study by Ebneth and Theuvsen (2005), internationalization of dairy
cooperatives

in

Europe

is

investigated.

They

assess

the

degree

of

internationalization by using the Foreign Sales Index and the Network Spread
Index as also a balance sheet analysis. By analyzing the balance sheets, Ebneth
and Theuvsen get information about the economic health of the company and the
capital structure. Financial resources are very important in the course of planning
and implementing internationalization strategies.
Under internationalization Ebneth and Theuvsen understand the process by which
an economy, industry or company becomes increasingly integrated into
international economic activities. The degree of internationalization measures to
what extent this economic integration has taken place. To determine the degree of
internationalization, activities on foreign markets are compared to home-market
or worldwide activities (Germann, Rurüp, and Setzer, 1996).
The measures used in the paper are defined as follows:

-Degree of Internationalization: DoI = (FSi + NSi)/2, with:
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Foreign Sales Index (FSi): Ratio of foreign sales (exports and subsidiaries)
to total sales.
Network Spread Index (NSi) with n* = 191 (United Nations, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2004): NSi = n/n* =
n/191 (the ratio of the number of countries in which the enterprise
maintains subsidiaries divided by the total number of countries that
received direct investments in 2003).

By adding the NSi in the formula for DoI, the measure tells us more than just the
amount of foreign sales as most companies in the beginning phase of
internationalization only have exports contributing to foreign sales. By adding the
NSi to the formula, the effect of subsidiaries, which involves longer term and
more stable internationalization, is counted in.

-Determining Corporate Success:
This is done by a balance sheet analysis with the focus on some financial ratios to
have insight in the liquidity (equity ratio, net debt to equity ratio, fixed assets per
tonne milk processed) and profitability (return on equity, return on assets, net
profit ratio, and added value index).

The results of the investigation for several European dairy coops are that the
three largest coops are also the most internationalized ones. At the time of the
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investigation Friesland Foods and Campina were not merged yet, resulting in the
following European top three:
Friesland Foods (40%), Campina (40%) and Arla Foods (36%). The German
dairy coops have a very limited degree of internationalization due to a low NSi.
The DoI consist mostly out of exports. Nordmilch and Humana had no
subsidiaries in 2005 compared with Arla Foods and Friesland that had more than
20. Figure 4-1 shows the Degree of Internationalization for several European
dairy coops.

Figure 4-1: Degree of internationalization of several European dairy coops.
Source: Ebneth and Theuvsen, 2005.

The balance sheet analysis showed several characteristics of the German dairy
coop. The fixed assets to tonnes of milk processed are relatively low for German
coops. This could be explained by low investment in new assets and the use of
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depreciated facilities. This low intensity of investments leads to a backlog demand
of future investments. Looking at the turnover per kg milk processed Nordmilch
as well as Hochwald have a relatively small ratio. This is caused by the fact that
German dairy coops usually focus on standardized low-cost and low-price mass
market products like milk, milk powder and butter. A coop like FrieslandCampina
(in 2005 Friesland Foods and Campina) has a diversified product range with
higher value added resulting in a higher turnover per kg milk processed. The
profitability ratios for Friesland and Campina show above average performance
while these ratios for Nordmilch and Hochwald show relatively low performance.

We can conclude that German cooperatives are less internationalized and less
successful financially. The competitive position of German coops is relatively
weak compared to many European competitors. A relative large number of dairies
results in a high competition level compared with the situation in the Netherlands,
where Friesland Foods and Campina had a combined market share of 70 to 80%
in 2008 (de la Mano et al., 2009). Strong price competition and a highly
concentrated retail sector results in low margins. Another reason why German
dairy coops perform worse is because they focus on processing low-cost and lowprice market articles instead of brands for which the margins are higher. The low
performance of the German coops gives rise to a lack of financial resources to
establish international business activities.

Dutch and Danish dairies are

confronted with a small home market. Specialization result in various value added
products. The degree of specialization is mainly determined by the size of the
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market (Stigler, 1951). In order to be cost effective, dairy coops with small home
markets are obliged to internationalize. However, this does not explain totally
why German dairy coops do not internationalize. It is often argued that perishable
products like milk have a low possibility to be traded on the world market. But
exports are only a part of the internationalization. Founding subsidiaries is another
and an even more stable and intensive13 way of internationalization. This results
in worldwide competition among dairies. Some authors expect that at the end of
the consolidation process in the dairy sector only 10 to 20 companies will have
survived (Krijger, 2004). Some characteristics of the governance of German
coops could contribute to the low degree of internationalization. As seen in the
low assets to tonnes milk processed an investment problem could be the reason
(Appendix 1). This due to ill-defined property rights which results in free riding
and also none or low tradable property rights. When property rights are ill-defined
the incentive to invest in the coop is reduced which results in no financial
resources to internationalize. When property rights are hard to trade, members
who are not economically connected anymore, for example retired farmers, hold
their property rights. These members are less interested in long-term returns, as
for example the investment that internationalization generates. Further the
transaction cost problem and the control problem could explain a delay of
response to a changing market environment on the European dairy market. The
13

For example, a subsidiary of Friesland Foods, Friesland Romania, entered the
Romanian market in 2000. Three years later the company purchased milk from
approx. 40,000 small farmers through 1,050 collection points and from approx.
600 larger farmers. Five factories processed the milk. Friesland Romania owns
the collection points and upgraded them with cooling and inspection facilities
(Dries et al, 2009).
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delay could be reinforced by the human resource problem which involves people
on decision making positions with low managerial know-how.
To address these problems coops like Campina, Arla Foods and Friesland Foods
changed their governmental structure and transformed to holding companies by
outsourcing their daily business activities to a professional management team (see
Structure FrieslandCampina, Appendix 5).

Internationalization through the establishment of subsidiaries abroad can reduce
also the effect of currency appreciation to total turnover. If the euro is appreciated,
export volumes drop resulting in a lower turnover and higher stocks on the local
market. This leads again to a higher supply so lower domestic prices. However if
a company decides to invest abroad in local milk production and consumption,
then this part of the companies activities is not harmed by an appreciated euro, it
can even benefit from it.

The German dairy coops have, due to an inefficient organizational structure which
leads to low flexibility to adapt to the changing market situation and high
competition in the home market, a worse position on the international market in
comparison with their European competitors. It must be noted that they are
catching up, by changing their organizational structure and investing in the
strategies as described before (see Appendix 5/Nordmilch).
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International trade has been historically of less importance for U.S. processors
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2011c). The main export country for SMP is
Mexico. In 2006 exports of the United States accounted 3.4% of the production
with a total value of 2.8 million tonnes milk equivalent (UN, Food and
Agriculture Organization, 2008). For the EU this was 9.1 million tonnes, which is
a share of 6.2% of total production in 2006 (UN, Food and Agriculture
Organization, 2008). The domestic market of the U.S. is big which reduces the
desire to internationalize. None of the U.S. cooperatives have plants abroad which
implies that direct investments in foreign markets is very limited (Dairy Foods,
2010). Dean Foods, a public traded company, has five international plants located
in Belgium, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and France.

Fonterra and

European dairies dominate the world market for export (Blayney and Gehlhar,
2005). The U.S. dairy market is seen as an opportunity for EU dairies and
Fonterra. These dairies made already considerable direct investments in the U.S.
(Blayney and Gehlhar, 2005 & Dairy Foods, 2010). However with rising global
prices it has been expected that U.S. dairies will play a more important role on the
international market (Blayney and Gehlhar, 2005). In a study of the Innovation
Center for U.S. Dairy, a strategic analysis of the global dairy landscape was
provided with focus on the challenges, opportunities and threats posed by
increasing globalization to the U.S. dairy industry (Innovation Center for U.S.
Dairy, 2009). They concluded that a dairy firm should transform from a “Fortress
USA” firm to a “Consistent Exporter”. This involves looking at the global
opportunities for U.S. milk supply, broad efforts to improve commercial focus
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and align product portfolio, collective effort to reform the marketing orders and
price support program, efforts to improve forward contracts and futures markets
(see Chapter 6), strong domestic market as a basis for global trade and joint
industry efforts to build insight and capabilities. A change of the policies that
temper the activities of the dairies internationally and domestically by preventing
a consumer oriented approach is seen as an important step to stimulate the
adaptation of new strategies. To achieve the strategy of being a “Consistent
Exporter” the Innovation Center recommended seven programs. These are listed
according to priority of execution:
- Reform of the regulated milk pricing systems and the price support
mechanisms
-Development of better mechanisms for risk management and reduction of
volatility
-Continued pursuit of trade treaties that provide net export benefits
-Analysis and prospective redirection of industry‟s global, pre-competitive
sales and marketing investments and capabilities
-Build on existing food safety assurances and traceability as a competitive
strength
-Develop better ability to

meet

customer product specification

requirements globally
-Encourage increased product and technology innovation
(Innovation Center for U.S. Dairy, 2009)
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Figure 4-2: Evolution from Fortress USA towards a Consistent Exporter by
the U.S. dairy Industry.
Source: Innovation Center U.S. Dairy, 2009.

4.5 4 Examples of Cooperative Organization and Strategy

In this section 4 dairy cooperatives will be discussed. FrieslandCampina and
Nordmilch as they are important players on the German market (Appendix 1),
Dairy Farmers of America as it is an important player on the U.S. market
(Appendix 1) and the New Zealand coop Fonterra will also be discussed as it is a
good example of cooperative structure and strategy in a liberalized dairy market.
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For a detailed look at the discussed cooperatives‟ organizational structure and
strategies, see Appendix 5.

In Table 4-3 characteristics of the cooperatives‟ organization is given and also the
strategies they implement.

Table 4-3: Examples of coops' organizational structure and strategies.
FrieslandCamp
ina

Fonterra

Dairy
Farmers of
America

Nordmilch

Financial entry
conditions

members must
invest to
receive
delivery rights:
4,00EUR/100k
g

member must
invest to
receive
delivery rights

member must
invest to
receive
delivery
rights:
1,75$/cwt

Financial
instruments

issuing bonds
to
members/retai
ned
earnings/Equit
y gain through
entry
fee/member
loans
75% is
retained/ 25%
is distributed
to farmers.

tradable and
appreciable
shares/retained
earnings

retained
earnings/
Equity gain
through entry
fee

members
must invest
to receive
delivery
rights:
4,00EUR/10
0kg
equity gain
through entry
fee

small part is
retained for
reinvestment/ap
preciation of
shares

71% is
retained in
the form of
member
equity
accounts/
29% is paid
cash

Investments

Distribution of
residual
surpluses

paid out to
farmers
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Table 4-3: Examples of coops' organizational structure and strategies
(Continued).
Nature of the
right to residual
claims

based on
quantity
delivered

Individual
right based
on
ownership
of the
share/
based on
quantity
delivered

based on
quantity
delivered

based
quantity
delivered

on

Governance
Voting rule

one member
one
vote/proportio
nal to
production
areas
Decision making Executive
rights and
Board under
monitoring
supervision of
the coop Board
of Directors/
coop Board of
Directors
Transactions
Pricing policy

Supply
management

Strategy
applied
Differentiation
Focus

Proportiona
l to
production
of member

one member
one
vote/proportio
nal to
production
areas
Coop
Board of
Board of
Directors
Directors
under
under
supervision of
supervision member
of
delegates
Shareholde
rs' Council

one member
one vote

Uniform
Pricing/extra
for quality

Uniform
Pricing

Uniform
pricing

Uniform
Pricing

unrestricted
delivery
(though
restricted by
individual
farmer‟s quota
+ delivery
rights)

Delivery
based on
shares that
are tradable
amongst
members

unrestricted
delivery
(though
restricted by
delivery rights)

unrestricted
delivery
(though
restricted by
individual
farmer‟s quota
+ delivery
rights)

Highly
Medium

Limited
Limited

Limited
Limited

Limited
Limited

Management
Team under
supervision of
Supervisory
Board
Nordmilch eG.
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Cost Leadership Highly
Strategy
Internationalizati Highly
on
Merger
Highly

Highly

Highly

Highly

Highly

Limited

Limited

Highly

Highly

Highly

Source: Based on collected data as presented in Appendix 5.

These leading dairy cooperatives adapted their organizational structure from a
collective one to a more individualized one. In order to raise capital, all dairies
applied the requirement of an initial investment in the cooperative in order to join
it. In the case of Fonterra, these are shares that are tradable amongst memberfarmers. FrieslandCampina has a variety of investment possibilities for farmers.
Instead of paying farmers the profits in cash, the coop is issuing bonds to
members that are tradable. The major gain of capital for Fonterra comes from
issuing shares (Fonterra, 2010). Residual claims are based on the quantity
delivered for members of FrieslandCampina and paid through bonds. Members of
Nordmilch are entitled to residual claims also based on the quantity delivered and
through a guaranteed interest on the capital invested in delivery rights. Members
of Fonterra are paid through appreciation of the shares and for DFA they are paid
cash based on the quantity delivered.
FrieslandCampina and Fonterra have a highly individualized member investment
scheme. FrieslandCampina present different financial instruments to its members
while Fonterra provides farmers with tradable shares. The effect is capital
availability

which

makes

the

adaptation

of

differentiation

strategies,

internationalization strategies, mergers and acquisitions possible.
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The structure of governance is mixed between a collective structure and an
individualized structure. Member involvement is a very important issue for
cooperatives. Fonterra has a very individualized voting rule. According to a
private firm, a farmer has a weight in the voting according to its shares.
FrieslandCampina and DFA both adopted an intermediate voting rule. Every
farmer has one vote, but according to the production in the region the number of
delegates is determined. Nordmilch applies the one man-one vote principle. The
cooperative Board of Directors is in all cooperatives the decision taker when
investments or mergers are discussed. The day to day business decisions are taken
by CEOs. These CEOs are not elected by the members for the case of Nordmilch,
FrieslandCampina and DFA. The CEOs are the head of a private company, 100%
owned by the cooperative. For the case of Fonterra, however, the cooperative
Board of Directors is accompanied by three experts to run the day to day
businesses. The cooperative Board of Directors is watching if the interests of
member farmers are guaranteed. This organizational hierarchy makes decision
making easier and quicker, however the decision making is happening far from
member-farmers‟ control. Investing in foreign markets would maybe not be
approved by members as they would prefer the capital to be invested in their
region. By reducing the governance problem through limiting the involvement of
members in the decision making process enables coops to make foreign direct
investments.
The pricing policy is for every dairy uniform pricing. Additional payments may
exist for additional quality. FrieslandCampina pays a higher price for milk
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containing omega 3. In that way, FrieslandCampina tried to apply the focus
strategy by creating/supplying a niche market. Unrestricted deliveries are still a
core characteristic of dairy cooperatives. FrieslandCampina announced that even
after the abolishment of the quota system it will procure all the milk the memberfarmers produce. However we see that Fonterra applied restricted delivery rights.
A farmer needs to purchase extra shares if extra milk wants to be delivered. By
issuing delivery rights, large cooperatives are able to gather capital in line with
milk deliveries.
We see that the leading dairy cooperatives already adapted to the changing market
conditions. These New Generation Cooperatives or Entrepreneurial Cooperatives
seem to be able to deal with global competition through effective capital gathering
and efficient governance.
4.6 How

do Changing Cooperative Strategies change Farmer-Coop

Relationship?
The International Cooperative Alliance defines a cooperative as an “autonomous
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social
and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically
controlled enterprise” (International Cooperative Alliance, 2010).

The dairy sector is determined by a stationary downstream flow. Cooperative
organizations form a specific relation between supplier and costumer. In order to
be able to offer a “fair” price to suppliers the coop has to be efficient and
competitive in their downstream markets. However with the recent market
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deregulations in the EU and the U.S., the economic environment is somewhat
destabilized, which in turn affects the supplier-coop relationship. Members
become more heterogeneous due to the nationalization and internationalization of
coops which results in members with a different cultural background and a
different structure of production (ref. Chapter 3). The members have also more
individualistic goals, which increase the difficulty for collective action
(Hovelaque, Duvaleix-Tréguer, and Cordier, 2008). Member heterogeneity gives
rise to classical cooperative problems as the investment problem, control problem,
influence problem, etc. In order to address these problems dairy cooperatives
change their structure more and more into entrepreneurial cooperatives with a
management board existing out of experienced business men who run the day to
day activities of the cooperative.

Normark (1996) states that proposal of strategic changes are often evaluated from
the viewpoint of effectiveness within the cooperative, without paying much
attention to the member-perspective. This can give rise to a negative relationship
between the cooperative and members. Several studies investigated loyalty of
farmers towards their dairy. Zeuli andd Betancor (2005) found that 27% of dairy
farmers in Wisconsin switched dairies in the period 1997-2001. By means of a
survey among the suppliers of a dairy in Southern Germany, Schulze, Wocken,
and Spiller (2008) found that only approx. 18% of the dairy‟s supply was not
threatened. Important factors for farmers‟ loyalty were commitment and trust
towards their dairy. Commitment was strongly effected by the switching cost to
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another dairy, by extension and communication, and satisfaction as also price
satisfaction; trust was strongly influenced by communication and extension, and
satisfaction. Some previous examples of farmers‟ disloyalty towards their dairy
were observed when 500 out of 2,100 milk suppliers of the German subsidiary of
the Dutch dairy coop Campina switched dairy. An other example is Nordmilch, it
is reported that in 2006 alone, 1,200 suppliers of the approx. 10,000 suppliers
from which Nordmilch procures raw milk, switched to an other dairy (Schulze,
Wocken, and Spiller, 2008). However Zeuli and Betancor (2005) concluded in
their study that members of dairy cooperatives are less likely to switch dairies.
The affiliation to cooperative ideology or the larger switching cost (taking the
horizon argument into account) could explain loyalty of farmers to their
cooperative.

In 't Veld (1996) stated that values should not be isolated from a cooperative
business as they are the foundations of the cooperative form. Fulton elaborates on
the importance of cooperative ideology and member commitment (Fulton, 1999).
He states that member commitment is a necessary factor for coops to exist (next
to the presence of market failure) and additionally to have a strong performance
on the market. Member commitment results from an additional value the coop
offers its members. This valuable factor can be that the members have an
opportunity to invest further down the supply chain, that they have a voice further
down the supply chain or the expression of cooperative ideology. Cooperative
ideology is defined by Fulton as a preference for certain types of outcomes.
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Cooperative formation historically was in a context broader than the economic
motivation of achieving a higher price. It was about the larger economic, political
and social environment of which farmers were part. Cooperative ideology
however is subject to changes over time. The role of ideology in today‟s
economic environment in the dairy sector can be found in the general focus of the
society towards sustainability. Grassroots movements like farmers markets have
increasing attention of producers and consumers and are supported by this
sustainability ideology. Biological dairy products can be seen within this context
and are widely produced in Germany.

The importance of member commitment is modeled by Fulton using a variation of
Hotelling‟s spatial model. The market is a duopoly market with a coop and an
IOF. Figure 4-3 shows the commitment model by Fulton.
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Figure 4-3: Cooperative commitment model.
Source: Fulton, 1999.

The horizontal axis θ represent the preference of the producers towards an IOF.
The vertical axis represents the price the coop, pc, or the IOF, pi, offers. λ is a
measure for member commitment towards the coop. A farmer that only wants to
do business with the coop is located on the left side of the model and gets a price
pc that represents the full value for the farmer. This value includes the value the
farmer has by doing business with the cooperative. The further the preference of
the farmer away from cooperative organization the more the cooperative price is
discounted, the same holds for farmers doing business with an IOF. The more
their preference is towards a different type of organization, the lower the value of
the price they get for their product. On the market an equilibrium exist, θ, where a
certain number of farmers will deliver to the coop and another number will
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deliver to the IOF. If λ is zero, than the highest price paid is the decision making
factor for farmers. However when member commitment is present, a certain
number of farmers with preference for cooperative organization will deliver to the
coop even when the price of the coop offered is lower than the price offered by
the IOF. In order to enlarge market share, coops and IOF move closer to each
other on the preference line. This involves that coops take over IOF values and
that IOF take over cooperative values. One could think, the older the cooperative,
the more it shifts to the middle. This fits the theory of Cook of five reasons to
transform discussed in section 4.3 Cooperative Organization. The leading
cooperatives in the dairy sector seem to be headed that way. This however,
creates room for new cooperatives to emerge on the left hand side of the
preference line. The question is: how will these cooperatives create an additional
value for its members? It must be noticed that the leading cooperatives like
Nordmilch in Germany and DFA in the U.S. are aware of the importance of
member

commitment.

Several

activities

for

members

and

ways

for

communication with members are established. However looking at the definition
of a cooperative according to the International Cooperative Alliance, we can say
that entrepreneurial cooperatives seem to reduce the importance of the
cooperative values when changing the organizational structure to an
individualized one. It seems that the changing organizational structure of the dairy
cooperatives gives rise to less involvement of member-farmers; the decision
making is more and more controlled by managers with a market oriented view,
which is making profit. Member-farmers are increasingly regarded as
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shareholders. The relationship with the cooperative becomes twofold; supplier
and investor. An individualized treatment of members also reduces the cohesion
among members, which in turn enforces member differentiation. Without member
commitment the supplier is drawn to the business with the highest price for his
product and as an investor he chooses the investment with the highest return. If
investment tools in a cooperative become increasingly tradable, the possibility for
members to reallocate their capital becomes easier.
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5 Competition
Competition on the dairy market is highly discussed. Concerns about unbalanced
market power are expressed by the Bundeskartellamt in Germany (Germany,
Bundeskartellamt, 2010) and in the U.S. a senate hearing regarding monopsony
power in agriculture markets was held in 2003 (U.S. Senate, Committee on the
Judiciary, 2003).
On the dairy market, cooperatives and investor owned firms compete for the
procurement of raw milk. The next section will provide some insight into this
competition, including the oligopsony potential on the market for raw milk
procurement and the influence of cooperatives on competition in the market14.
5.1 Oligopsony Power and Collusive Behavior
The dairy market, like other agricultural markets for non-storable goods, is
characterized by certain conditions which enhance the possibility of oligopsony
power of processors.
Rogers and Sexton (1994) define three characteristics of agricultural markets
explaining why they are prone to oligopsony power. These characteristics are
converted for the case of milk:

-

Milk is a bulky and perishable, causing shipping costs to be high,
restricting the products‟ geographic mobility, and limiting farmers‟ access
to only those buyers located close to the production site.

14

The aim of the equations used in this chapter is merely to provide insight in
certain relationships. This chapter does not provide empirical models.
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-

The input of milk for processors is very important; milk in the process is
not substitutable by an other input, also other processing plants, for
example a orange juice plant, can not switch from one day to the other to
start processing milk.

-

Farmers are specialized in the production of milk; this goes together with
specialized knowledge and high fixed cost to produce milk. These assets
represent exit barriers, entry barriers, for farmers, respectively nonfarmers, and cause milk supply to be inelastic.

Markets with high transportation cost are by definition “spatial markets” (Rogers
and Sexton, 1994). High buyer concentration in the market coupled with an
inelastic supply jointly constitutes compelling evidence of buyer market power
(Rogers and Sexton, 1994). In the following subchapters we will have a look at
the spatial effect of milk procurement.
Appendix 6 provides a map with the location of the plants of the major dairy
processors in U.S. and Germany. We notice that plants in both countries are
regionally located for most processors, although in the U.S. the nationwide
position of Dean Foods is observable. Regionally located processors contribute to
the spatial character of the procurement markets and spatial competition between
processors.
An additional characteristic of the dairy market is the high rate of merging dairies
(Jacobson and Cropp, 1995). Dairies merge to increase the countervailing
bargaining power towards retailers, to lower production cost and increase
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efficiency in order to stay competitive towards its rivals. However, mergers
increase the concentration of processors which raise the possibility of oligopsony
power in a spatial market. Tozanli (1998) indicated that as the result of mergers
and acquisitions the number of European dairy firms is getting smaller and this
concentration process is ubiquitous in the European dairy industry where the
major tendency leans toward an undeniably oligopolistic market structure. In both
Germany and the U.S. the market concentration of the processors increases over
time (ref. Chapter 3).
The effects of oligopsony power can be limitation of entry15 by other processors
and a lower price offered upstream to farmers. The latter effect will be looked at
more closely due to its relevance on the dairy market today and due to its
relevance in contract formation as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Next to exogenous factors (market power of retailers, technology, and regional
character of dairies) that contribute to the formation of the oligopsonistic
character of the procurement market for milk, there can be also endogenous
factors, which can be regarded as tools decided to be used by the processor to
increase its oligopsony potential. These tools have only an effect in a collusive
environment. This can be tacit or explicit. When explicit, competition authorities
intervene as this does not conform to competition policy. Tacit collusion, however,
is hard to prove. An example of tacit collusion is a type of reference pricing, when

15

Fonterra is accused for paying out a high “notional” milk price compared with
its competitors in order to prevent farmers from switching to another dairy and
lessen competition (Fox, 2011).
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a company sets its price in function of its competitors. This is also called price
matching. The effect is the possibility of monopsonic behavior for the companies
involved. In a paper by Ivaldi et al. (2003) on the economics of tacit collusion
prepared for the European Commission, the relevant factors for collusion are
discussed. These are:
-

Collusion is more difficult when there are more competitors.

-

Market share asymmetry may reflect more profound and relevant
asymmetries that tend to make collusion more difficult to sustain.

-

Collusion cannot be sustained in the absence of entry barriers and it is
more difficult to sustain, the lower the entry barriers.

-

Frequent interaction and frequent price adjustments facilitate collusion.

-

The lack of transparency on prices and sales does not necessarily prevent
collusion completely, but makes it both more difficult to sustain and more
limited in scope.

-

For a fixed number of market participants, collusion is easier to sustain in
growing markets, where today‟s profits are small compared with
tomorrow‟s ones.

-

Demand fluctuations hinder collusion, and more so when fluctuations are
deterministic rather than random.

-

The more likely innovation is, the more difficult it is to sustain collusion.

-

With an asymmetric cost structure, and the most effective collusive
conducts will involve asymmetric market shares, reflecting firms‟ costs,
there is less scope for collusion.
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-

Asymmetries in capacity constraints hinder collusion.

-

Multi-market contact facilitates collusion.
(Source: Ivaldi et al., 2003)

The dairy market has several of these characteristics that facilitate tacit collusive
behavior:
-

The amount of competitors is decreasing and a spatial factor limits the
market area.

-

Entry barriers are present due to the high fixed cost requirement, specific
know-how and the strong competition and merger activities. Entry in the
processing market is observed to be low in both the U.S. and the German
market.

-

There is a high frequency of interaction on the market as dairy products
are flow products.

-

Transparency is increasing on the market due to an increasing monitoring
of the sector by government. Also the leading cooperatives recognize the
importance of sharing information with its members. Access to
information is facilitated through the internet in general. Dairies have well
established sites and are active in the digital social networks. The
information is also accessible for the competitors.

-

The world dairy demand is growing. For the U.S. processors, this is joined
by a growth in domestic demand. Future earnings are larger than present
ones and it is feasible for the industry to join forces nationwide to
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influence policy changes and stimulate the presence of the nation‟s dairy
sector on the world market and abroad.
-

The effect of the internationalization of dairies will enlarge their multimarket contact out of the control of farmers in the home market.

The dairy market has also characteristics that do not facilitate tacit collusion:
-

Demand is quite inelastic for dairy products. However as seen during the
financial crisis, the world demand reacted strongly when the economy
slowed down.

-

Product innovation is highly present as the processing sector and
especially the large cooperatives are focusing on value added products
next to traditionally producing commodities.

Exogenous factors present in the dairy market facilitate collusion and thus the
possibility to exert oligopsony power by processors. To understand that, the
concept of spatial markets is discussed in the next subchapter 5.2 Spatial Markets.
5.2 Spatial Markets
A key concept in describing competition to procure raw milk on the market is the
effect of transportation cost. As milk is characterized to be bulky and perishable,
the procurement of raw milk goes together with high transportation costs.
The spatial factor can be regarded to increase over time as the concentration in the
processing sector also increases. The number of milk processing facilities
decreased by approx. 21% in Germany during 1997-2006 (Graubner et al., 2011),
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in the U.S. accordingly the amount of milk processing plants decreased in the
same period with 27% (Gould, 2010). Plant size, however, increased combined
with more efficient transportation possibilities for raw milk. This contributed to
the decrease of the number of plants. Thus, fewer plants do not necessarily
involve a reduction in competition as the action radius of the plants increased.
There is a trade off between the number of plants and the action radius regarding
the overlapping of markets. However, the regional character of processors,
combined with increasing concentration and a reduction in plants, all indicate an
increasing possibility for oligopsonistic market power even when the market
radius around a plant increases.

In a paper by Sexton (1990), the effect of spatial competition on the price spread
between farmers and processors is elaborated.
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that two processors are homogenous and
are price takers, farmers are also homogenous and distributed uniformly in a
linear space with density D and production function q =q( w) with q’>0. The
processors are located on the ends of the market. It is also defined that the
producers bear the transportation cost. This pricing method is called free on board
pricing (FOB). Next it is assumed that there are economics of scale in processing
(i.e. rising marginal costs (m) with m‟>0 and m‟‟>>0 for the processing firm).
The assumption of economics of scale is necessary to generate a spatial
distribution of processors. Also, the conversion factor is assumed to be one, which
involves a complete conversion of raw material into product. No substitution
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between the raw product and other processing inputs is possible. Taking these
assumptions into account, Sexton finds the following relation for the price spread:

(1)
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  w, R   w , L   L , R
w
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(2)
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w R
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p is the processed product price net of marginal non-raw product processing costs,
w stands for the price the processor pays for the raw milk minus the transportation
costs, R stands for the total amount procured by the processor which is equal to
the equivalent amount of product as the conversion factor is equal to one, L is the
market radius of the processor.
Equation (1) shows the components of the price spread. Component (2) is positive
and entails that the volume of procurement increases when the price increases
taking into account a constant market radius. This involves that if the price
increases, farmers within the market radius of the processor will increase their
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production. Component (3) is negative and entails that, when the market radius
increases, the price for producers will drop as the market power of the processor
increases with increasing market radius. Component (4) measures the processor‟s
perception of competitive conditions in the market.

The competition depends on the behavior of the competing processors:
-

Löschian competition (LO) holds that each competitor behaves as if his
market area is fixed. LO behavior represents collusive behavior.

-

Hotelling-Smithies (H-S) competition holds that each competitor believes
that his action will not affect rival‟s prices. H-S competition represents
competitive behavior.

-

Cournot-Nash competition (C-N) holds that a given competitor‟s quantity
changes will go unheeded by rivals.

The effect of these behavioral conjectures is shown within the assumption of
equilibrium behavior, which is that the net prices of rivals are equal at their
common borders. This assumption results in:

(5)

dL  dw d w  1



dR  dR dR  2t

d w is the rival‟s procurement price and t is the transportation cost. In the case of
the Löschian conjecture, (5) is equal to zero as the market radius is fixed and does
not change with a change in procurement volume. This has as a result that d w /dw
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= 1, which means that any price change by a processor will exactly be matched by
its rival. This leads to the joint monopsony solution when all firms entertain this
conjecture. For Hotelling-Smithies conjecture d w /dw = d w /dR = 0. This leads to
the competitive solution as all actions of the rivals are independent from each
other, which is known to generate the competitive solution, where price equals
marginal cost. An increase in market radius is joined by an increase in price to
attract additional supply. The higher the transportation cost the lower the market
radius increase. For the Cournot-Nash conjecture d R /dR = 0, which involves
competition on quantities.
This results into three formulas for the price spread under these behavioral
conjectures:
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It follows that (6)>(8)>(7). Assuming a given price for processors, p, Löschian
behavior results in the lowest price for farmers, whereas Hotelling-Smithies
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behavior results in the highest. Collusive behavior of the form price matching,
results in a lower producer surplus and higher processor profits.

In an article by Alvarez et al. (2000), oligopsony power with uniform spatial
pricing on the procurement market in Spain is investigated. This is in contrast of
the previous free on board pricing (FOB) assumption where the cost of transport
is borne by the producer. Under uniform spatial pricing or uniform delivered
pricing (UD) the processor bears the transportation cost. This can be regarded as
discriminatory pricing because the seller does not bear the actual cost of shipping
its product (Alvarez et al, 2000). Producers close to the plant are negatively
discriminated as they get a lower price for their milk due to transportation cost
sharing with producers located further from the plant. UD pricing is common in
practice on the milk procurement market (Greenhut, 1981; Durham, Sexton and
Song, 1996; Table 4). The popularity of UD pricing is due to its administrative
simplicity and it enables firms to compete effectively over a larger geographical
area (Alvarez et al, 2000; Greenhut, Norman and Hung, 1987). Another reason for
UD pricing is that it fits coop ideology of equal membership. As seen in the
previous section FOB pricing results in non-overlapping market areas for each
competing firm, UD pricing permits overlapping markets. In reality we see
overlapping procurement markets as shown in Figure A6-1 and Figure A6-2 in
Appendix 6.
Under Hotelling-Smithies competition firms set their prices regardless of the
prices of their competitors. It is now easy to understand that if a firm offers a
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higher price than its competitors under UD pricing, this firm will capture the
whole supply. However considering the ratio:

(9) s p  td p

with d the distance between two rival processors located on a line, t the freight
rate per unit of distance and s the measure of absolute importance of space on the
market involved. When this ratio is sufficiently great, each firm can behave as a
spatial monopsonist. A high value for ratio (9) implies that the absolute
importance of space in the market outweighs the net value of the product for the
processor.
Considering Löschian competition under UD pricing, the assumption of fixed
market areas is not feasible as given UD pricing, market areas are overlapping and
are constantly changing with the price the firm or its rivals pay for raw milk. For
Löschian competition under UD pricing Alvarez et al. (2000) are considering
price-matching conjecture (PM), which is implied through fixed market areas
under FOB pricing as discussed above. This price matching conjecture implies
that firms pay the same price and have as consequence the same market radius.
The degree to which markets overlap between duopsonists depends on the ratio
described in equation (9). For s/p ≥ 4/3 both firms can behave as spatial
monopsonists. The spatial effect dominates. For 4/7 < s/p < 4/3 the market areas
overlap in the area between the firms. For s/p ≤ 4/7 the market areas of both firms
overlap beyond the distance between the firms. In the latter case, space is less
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important relative to the net value of the finished product. The implications for
price transmission for the PM conjecture under UD pricing is given by the
following equations:
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with u* the optimal UD price. Equations (10) and (11) show that under PMbehavior with UD pricing, the price paid to farmers is increasing with an
increasing net average product value. However, when space is less important and
market areas overlap beyond the rival‟s plant position (also called competition in
the backyard) the price transmission is smaller then when space is more important.
It can be concluded that larger overlapping market areas have as effect a lower
price transmission to farmers under PM behavior and UD pricing. If the value of
the net product has much more importance than the space factor, the market is not
spatial anymore. The price transmission is then equal to the case of a single
monopsonist in a non spatial market. Out of equation (12) and (13) we can
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conclude that with the increase of s, the space component, the farmer‟s price
increases when space is relatively less important and the farmer‟s price decreases
when space is relatively more important. This can be explained by the following;
when transportation cost rises, a firm increases its price and so do its rivals under
PM strategy. By doing this the firm will reduce its market area and so will its
competitors and will reap more benefits due to an increase of milk procured from
producers that are located closer to the plant. Processors end up pricing above the
monopsony level when markets are overlapping beyond the location of the rival‟s
plant as they have an incentive to reduce their rival‟s and their own market area.
This effect is smaller for plants that are located close to each other (small d
decreases the impact on s when transportation cost rise).

In a paper of Graubner et al. (2011) competition on the German milk procurement
market was investigated with a model based on UD pricing under PM behavior.
An additional aspect in this paper is the implementation of bargaining
cooperatives and a more flexible supply function of the form q = uy. Bargaining
cooperatives have as effect that processors may not be able to choose its optimal
market radius and in this model they serve the whole market (the whole market in
this model is described as the area between the two rivals, i.e. 4/7 < s/p < 4/3).
The more flexible supply function makes it possible to investigate the impact of
the supply elasticity on price transmission. The following relationships are
obtained:
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Equation (16) shows us the effect of the elasticity on the price transmission. In the
model according to Alvarez et al. (2000) the elasticity is assumed to be one which
results in a value for equation (16) equal to equation (11). With a price elasticity
of one the percentage price change equals the percentage quantity change. The
milk supply elasticity on the long run under the quota system has a value of 0.054
(Requillart et al., 2008). This results in a value for equation (16) equal to 0.05,
which involves a low price transmission. The effect of the abolishment of the
quota system on price transmission can be positive as the supply elasticity is
expected to increase (see section Quota, Chapter 2), this however, assuming a
market that has UD pricing and PM behavior.

The average transportation cost in Germany was 0.01EUR/kg raw milk in
2007(Friedrich, 2010). If we regard this as the absolute importance of space, i.e. s
and we assume a net value for dairy products of 0.40 EUR/kg16 we get a value for
s/p equal to 0.025 which involves overlapping markets, with a market overlap
greater than the inter-firm distance. In reality we can expect a smaller net product
16

This value is taken as approximate to the wholesale price for dairy products in
Germany between 1998-2007 (Graubner et al, 2011). This can be considered as
the maximum value for p possible taking marginal processing costs are zero.
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value, which would increase the importance of space. However, the space factor
is not that straightforward in reality. If we look at Figure A6-1 in Appendix 6, we
see that the processing plants of the largest German dairies are regional located.
This would result in a higher distance between competing firms and increase the
importance of space. Also with increasing fuel prices, increasing labor costs and
decreasing amount of processing facilities the space factor gains importance
which involves reduced competition on the market. Another aspect is regional
geographic differences. The transportation cost per kg milk is larger in South
Germany than in the East Germany (Friedrich, 2010). Graubner et al. (2011) find
for the price transmission on the German market a value smaller than 0.5, which
confirms the presence of spatial market power and PM behavior and a low supply
elasticity. However it must be noted that market power is not always the source of
imperfect price transmission, it can also be caused by adjustment costs, inflation,
and perishability of products or inventories (Peltzman, 2000).

In the U.S., the FMMO policy provides dairies with a minimum uniform price
they have to pay to farmers. FMMO can also interfere with price transmission.
The minimum uniform price is calculated based on market prices and processors
marginal cost to process raw milk. This can have a fixing effect on the price
transmission as it relates market prices and processors costs with the minimum
uniform price. A similar analysis as the one done by Graubner et al. (2011) could
provide evidence for PM behavior on the U.S. market. However, the fact that
wholesale prices for dairy products are closely related to the price achieved on the
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CME market, can be interpreted that dairy traders use the CME prices as
reference prices for their products.

Comparing the plant density in both countries, we find for the U.S. 1.5
plants/10,000km² and for Germany 8 plants/10,000km². This would involve that
the U.S. is more prone to oligopsony markets than Germany, however production
in the U.S. is much more clustered in states like California, Wisconsin, etc.,
where the number of plants is higher too. In states where milk production is not
“big”, outside options for farmers can be very limited, especially when they deal
with national milk procurers (e.g. DFA), who have more bargaining power due to
the relative unimportance of a single market area.
5.3 The Effect of Cooperatives on Competition
The difference between the cooperative and IOF are twofold. First, the pricing of
a cooperative is done by distributing all its profits over its members. Secondly, by
joining supply, bargaining cooperatives make it harder for processors to set their
optimal market radius.

The goals of the two types of businesses are different. The cooperative breaks
even, while the IOF makes profit. To illustrate this we follow Sexton (1990).
Again the assumptions are the same as for the example of spatial markets under
FOB pricing (no market overlap).

We define NARP = Net Average Revenue Product
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The coop maximizes its profit when it sets w where NMRP intersects member
supply. However, for the coop to break even, member supply must intersect
NARP. This is the second-best solution as the coop does maximize its profit
subject to the break even constraint.
If wc (price of the cooperative for raw milk) is set where NMRP intersects with
NARP, the coop‟s profit is maximized and the break even constraint is fulfilled.
However, this solution has only one outcome and can thus only be maintained
through fixed supply.

When a coop competes with an IOF we find
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After some conversions we get for the price spread for an open membership
cooperative:
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With:

 > 1 when NARP is increasing (NARP < NMRP)
 = 1 when NARP is a maximum (NARP = NMRP)
0 <  < 1 when NARP is decreasing (NARP > NMRP)

Under an increasing NARP (6) > (8) > (7) > (20)
When NARP is at its maximum (7) = (20)
Under a decreasing NARP (6) > (8) > (20) > (7)

When a coop is in the situation where NARP is smaller than NMRP it can
increase its profits by attracting supply thus having an open membership policy.
This results in competitive behavior on the market with a reducing effect on the
price spread of competing IOF. However, the first best solution is reached when
NARP equals NMRP; this is when the coop can maximize its profits like an IOF
under the break even constraint. The coop can be tempted to close its membership
as additional supply will result in a lower NARP. However if the coop fixes its
procurement by closing membership the IOF can entertain Löschian competition,
that is behave like the market areas are fixed. This would result in an increase of
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the price spread; the IOF can behave like a monopsonist in its market area. If the
coop, however, does not close down its membership, the NARP decreases but
competition on the market is benefited as the producer price spread stays lower
than if the firms on the market behave under the Cournot-Nash conjecture. So it
can be concluded that an open membership cooperative, that sets prices equal to
its net average revenue product, induces pro-competitive behavior in a spatial
market. Farmers have thus an incentive to organize coops. This is also called the
incentive to induce a yard-stick effect.

In a paper of Tribl (2009) the effect of a coop in a duopsony market facing an IOF
is discussed. Tribl follows the model as described in the example of Alvarez et al.
(2000), which is a duopsony market with overlapping market areas due to UD
pricing. The model by Tribl (2009) is adapted by locating the procurers at the
endpoints of the linear market and assuming that the whole market is shared by
the processors as is the case in the paper by Graubner et al. (2011) by assuming
the presence of bargaining coops. The coop prices at NARP. Tribl compares three
market types, a pure IOF market, a pure coop market and a mixed market. The
pure coop market results in the highest price for farmers, whereas the mixed
market results in higher prices compared to the pure IOF market. These findings
confirm the yardstick effect coops have on the market.

The pure coop market is discussed by Huck, Salhofer, and Tribl (2006). It is an
extension of the model by Alvarez et al (2000) by replacing the IOFs by coops.
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Comparing the results with the ones of Alvarez et al., Huck finds a double price
transmission for a pure coop market. Again the lowest price transmission is found
for competition in the back yard as the coops have an incentive to increase the
procurement from farmers closer to the plant and decrease competition. By
applying their model to the case of milk procurement in Schleswig-Holstein (a
state in Northern Germany where 95% of the milk is procured by coops (Huck,
Salhofer, and Tribl, 2006)), they conclude that the coops are competing in the
back yard. Further, they advise consolidation of the procurers as that would
induce a higher price for farmers.

We discussed in chapter 5.2 Spatial Markets the effect of bargaining cooperatives
under UD pricing with PM strategy. Graubner et al. (2011) also show that there is
an

equilibrium

under

Hotelling-Smithies

competition

when

bargaining

cooperatives are present and when farmers choose a processor with equal
probability. Bargaining cooperatives prevent the processor to choose its optimal
market radius. Under Hotelling-Smithies competition, a processor raises its price
in order to dominate the whole market. However by doing so, the processor
attracts suppliers from around the whole market as suppliers choose a processor
with equal probability. This result in additional negative profits due to high
transportation costs. The processor finds an equilibrium price that is the price for
which its total profits are zero.
Taking this into account, Graubner et al. designed a payoff matrix under PM and
HS competition with UD pricing. This payoff matrix is presented in Figure 5-1.
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Processor B

Processor A

HS

PM

HS

0;0

PHS;0

PM

0;PHS 1/2PPM;1/2PPM

Figure 5-1: Payoff matrix for Hotelling-Smithies and Price Matching
competition under Uniform Pricing.
Source: Graubner et al., 2011.

It is obvious that the dominant strategy for both processors is HS behavior.
However, this results for both in zero profits. The Pareto optimal solution is to
adopt PM behavior and so to cooperate with each other. In a market with UD
pricing and when processors can not choose their market radius, processors
optimal strategy is to collude.

5.4 Pricing Methods and Competition
Dairies have different pricing methods. Three can be distinguished; the
cooperative pricing method, the reference pricing method, and the negotiating
method (Schlecht and Spiller, 2009). With regard to what is described above the
cooperative pricing is the equivalent to the coop setting prices according to the
NARP. A coop, pricing according to this method and applying an open
membership policy, has a pro competitive effect on the market. However one can
ask if the pricing by the entrepreneurial coops is done that way. The coop is run
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by managers that maximize the profit, to reinvest or to return to members in the
form of dividend on shares. The cooperative does not price at NARP but at
NMRP. There is no yard stick effect present. If the reference pricing is, like in the
case of FrieslandCampina‟s pricing method and according to Huck, Salhofer, and
Tribl (2006) the common pricing procedure of dairy processors in Germany,
based on the average of the surrounding competitors prices, the change of prices
between competitors are closely related which is a characteristic of the Löschian
conjecture. The effect of this pricing method is thus non-competitive. The
negotiating method to set prices should bring forward competitive behavior if the
bargaining power of both negotiators is equal. Looking at the assumptions as set
before, the farmer does not have any bargaining power, for he is a price taker. The
farmer is assumed to deliver to the dairy where he can maximize its profit. This
depends on how firms on the market compete and set procurement prices. The
Bundeskartellamt expressed its concern about the pricing methods of dairies in
Germany as one of the factors that reduce price competition (Germany,
Bundeskartellamt, 2010).

Regarding FOB pricing or UD pricing, Zhang and Sexton (2001) found for the
case of an IOF duopsony market that when s is small, a firm‟s optimal choice is to
choose FOB pricing. As seen before the firms only compete at the market borders
with each other and are able to behave like a monopsonist in the area closer to the
plant. When the space becomes more important UD is the preferred pricing
method by processors, however this is for quite large values of s. UD pricing,
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even though it result in inefficient transportation, results in higher welfare for low
s values due to a higher competition level in overlapping markets.
Fousekis (2010) investigated the effect of coops on the choice of the pricing
method, i.e. FOB or UD. In a mixed duopsony, firms choose UD pricing when s is
relative small. When space becomes more important FOB pricing is applied by
the coop, the IOF first sticks with UD pricing but turns indifferent for larger
values of s. Regarding the earlier suggested value of 0.01 for the absolute value of
space for milk in Germany, UD pricing for both coops and IOFs represents the
equilibrium.
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6 Contracting
The structural transformation of the dairy market, as discussed in previous
sections, results in increasing risk. Risks involve the price but also involve
quantities, as these are becoming more concentrated. The emergence of contracts
in the dairy sector is observable. Contracts can have many forms, they can be
unwritten agreements between two parties, or they can be written, legally binding
contracts. When talking about contracts in dairy markets several attributes are
necessary in an agreement between processor and producer, i.e. price, quantity,
duration and quality standards of the product. While private firms usually specify
these attributes, cooperatives tend to have more open, uniform contracts. This
involves no limit on quantity, price determined by the market price and the
cooperative performance, duration unlimited (usually around a year notice of
contract termination), and quality according to government regulations. In the
changing market environment this type of contracting is under pressure.
Individualized contracts tend to respond more to the market environment of the
future. Increasing member heterogeneity and consumer oriented production
reflects the necessity to individualize contracts and market volatility reflects the
necessity to incorporate risk reduction in contracting. Price risk management is
highly discussed on the U.S. dairy market. A system is set up to reduce price risk
for farmers and the industry. This involves forward contracting combined with a
futures market.
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6.1 Price Risk Management on the U.S. Dairy Market
Price volatility is increasing in the German as well as the U.S. dairy market. In the
U.S. this phenomena is already recognized and a governmental program to reduce
price risk for farmers is set up called the Dairy Forward Pricing Pilot Program.
The program was established to promote forward contracting between farmers
and dairies. A forward contract is an agreement between a buyer and a seller to
sell an agreed quantity of a product at an agreed price for an agreed period in the
future. The program was installed to promote forward contracting as it exempted
milk handlers from paying the minimum blend price as provided by the FMMO.
The program was effective from July 2000 until December 2004 and was
reinstated by the Farm Bill of 2008. The handlers could only forward contract the
milk used for non-fluid purposes, i.e. Class II, III, IV milk. Also, any first time
contract could only be made for a time period less or equal to 12 months. The
effects of the program were analyzed in a report of the USDA‟s Agricultural
Marketing Service covering the first two years of the program (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, 2002). In another report provided on the e-platform Understanding
Dairy Markets by the University of Wisconsin, the 4 year period was analyzed
(Gould, 2005). The prices realized in the forward contracts were substantially
lower than the non-contract prices for milk over the first two year period of the
program. However the researchers believed that due to the limited time span of
the study, the observation of a period where the prices were higher was not made.
They refer to a quote by the USDA:
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“Over time, we should expect to see forward prices to producers below the blend
price in some months and above the blend price in other months… On balance,
the pluses and minuses should cancel each other out since, one could argue, the
desired objective of forward contracting is to remove the uncertainty and
variability in prices…” (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002). The report
covering the whole length of the program showed that the price achieved through
forward contracting was lower than the market price but that the volatility of the
price was reduced.
Unbalanced bargaining power could also contribute to a lower contract price.
There can be several reasons for an unequal bargaining power: significant
difference between the size and turnover, economic dependency arising out of a
long term business relationship, significant sunk costs already incurred by the
farmer, and changing supply and demand conditions (European Commission,
2010d). A report of the Ling and Liebrand (1996) stated, by looking at other
commodity markets where forward contracting is done, that producers pay a price
for shifting market risk to other parties.
The reasons for farmers to forward contract were mainly to assure a stable cash
flow (75% of the producers), 45% contracted because the offered price was
attractive to them. Nearly 60% of the contracting producers thought that the trade
off between the lower contract price and the reduced risk was not worth it (U.S.
Department of Agriculture, 2002).
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A future or a futures contract is an agreement between two parties to trade a
certain quantity17 of a product at a certain price at a certain time. The price agreed
is the estimation of the seller and the buyer what the product will be worth (the
spot price) at the time of trade with a difference of the so called “normal
backwardation”. This is the risk premium paid by the seller to the buyer due to the
uncertainty of the spot price at the moment of trade. Futures market involves trade
of futures and options. An option can be regarded is an insurance on the future. It
is the possibility to “call” or “put” the future. The buyer of a call option has the
right to buy (call) the future, for an agreed price, called the strike price, over the
period the option is valid. The buyer pays a premium for the option and hopes the
value of the futures contract will be higher than the strike price plus the premium.
The buyer of a put option has the right to sell (put) the future, at the strike price
over the period the option is valid. The buyer pays a premium for the option and
hopes the value of its future minus the premium will not be lower than the present
market value, if so the option can be used to sell the future for the strike price. In
reality only small shares of the futures contracts actually result in delivery of the
product (Ling and Liebrand, 1996). Futures are used as a financial instrument to
reduce the price risk. On the futures market there are hedgers and speculators. The
hedgers sell futures contracts, which they cover when the future is about to mature.
When a future matures, actual delivery of product is acquired. By buying futures

17

At the CME the quantity traded in one monthly future is 200,000 pounds. The
CME offers futures and options on Class III and Class IV milk, butter (two
different types), nonfat dry milk (two different types) and on dry whey (Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, 2011). It also provides spot markets for butter, cheese and
nonfat dry milk (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002).
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when they are about to mature, no delivery is required as the quantity sold is equal
to the quantity bought. Speculators buy and sell futures to make a profit.
Speculators provide the market with liquidity. They buy the futures offered by the
hedger and sell them back before they mature. The hedger tries to reduce its price
risk, while the speculator tries to make a profit. In U.S. two markets trade dairy
futures. The CME started trading dairy futures in 1996. The New York Coffee,
Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) started trading cheddar cheese and NFD-milk
futures and options in 1992. Historically, dairy product cash markets have been
referred to as “thin” markets. The market is closely observed by a number of
commercial traders in various segments of the dairy industry who stand ready to
buy or sell large amounts of milk to influence the market price when thought
necessary (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002). The price of dairy products as
observed by the NASS is highly correlated with the CME price for dairy products
which shows the price making role of the CME.

Farmers have two options to reduce price risk due to volatility and uncertainty18;
forward contract their milk or futures contract their milk. The USDA encouraged
farmers to enter the futures market with the Dairy Option Pilot Program. This was
an educational program to make farmers able to hedge. Maynard et al. (2005)
evaluated the risk management potential of private milk hedging. They found that
the farmers that joined the Dairy Option Pilot Program reduced their price risk by
50-60% and on average had a hedging ratio of around 60%. In this study Maynard
18

Next to differntiation strategy and value-adding strategy which reduce price
risk by accessing other markets then the raw milk market.
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et al. also refer to the price risk reduction the FMMO provides to farmers. They
found that the PPD acts as a buffer when Class III prices change. This provides a
risk reduction in the producer price under the FMMO. Maynard et al. suggested
five reasons why hedging may not be favored by a producer to reduce price risk:
-

No information was available about the effect of hedging on reducing risk.

-

The size of futures contracts, i.e. 200,000 pounds favored large producers
and formed a barrier for small producers.

-

Transaction costs are rather high as hedging requires time to follow
futures market, establishing a hedging strategy and evaluating its
performance on a regular monthly basis.

-

Hedging is psychologically demanding as the farmer takes all
responsibility of achieving a good price on him.

-

Some producers think hedging is unnecessary as milk is a flow product
and the average price they get is the market price, suggesting they
perceive risk over a long term.

Additionally Ling and Liebrand (1996) mention a risk that farmers can face and
that is due to illiquid futures markets. When the future matures and farmers are
not able to lift the hedge, they could be faced with high cost to deliver the milk as
they usually do not have the equipment to transport milk and it could be against
the agreement made with the regular dairy (especially dairy cooperatives due to
the obligation to deliver all milk).
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Maynard, Wolf, and Gearhardt (2005) conclude to suggest that for some farmers
forward contracting is a better alternative. The benefits of forward contracting are
less time spent on managing the marketing of milk, no volume restrictions are
present to step in a forward contract, price determination can be for a longer
period providing financial security to small producers and to their banks, and cash
flow concerns can be reduced as forward contract markets are highly liquid.
Due to the illiquid futures market, hedging through futures markets seems
inadequate to reduce price risk, for that the need of government programs to
reduce the risk appears necessary. However these government programs result in
a low use of the futures market, which in turn makes it not mature. The
importance of government is to reduce its risk reducing programs and to stimulate
the use of cash markets to hedge price risk, making them liquid.

In an article of Boussard (2003) futures contracts are compared with production
quotas. Boussard argues that these two systems to reduce price risk volatility are
closely related. They are an agreement stating a fixed price for a fixed quantity.
Only the party the producer is dealing with is different; government versus a
private operator. Government bears the risk of low world prices and the benefit of
high world prices. The private operator however is not willing to take as much
risk as government and charges higher fees, called “normal backwardation 19 ”.
This results in a gain of efficiency due to government intervention comparable

19

Normal backwardation is defined by Boussard (2003) as “the difference at the
time of the contract setting, between the price of the contract and the expected
spot price at delivery time”.
138

with when government builds roads. Boussard refers here to an article of Arrow
and Lind (1970), which argues that the role of government is to bear risk
whenever risk markets do not exist or do not work efficiently. Boussard argues
further that commodity prices fluctuate according to a chaotic dynamic system. In
such a system variables are sensitive to initial conditions, that is, a slight change
in value at time t can result in a huge change of value at time t + n. This explains
that prices in commodity markets are autocorrelated, yet still unpredictable. The
chaotic cobweb based on the work of Ezekiel (1938) is with modern dynamic
theory joined by return strings. In a cobweb model with inelastic demand and
elastic supply return strings prevent extreme or negative values for prices and
quantities. These return strings in commodity markets reflect risk averse behavior
of producers and the decay of capital. These return strings reduce the volatility of
commodity markets. Boussard argues that when taking away or reducing these
return strings by providing for example a fixed price (no price risk aversion
anymore) the system goes to bankruptcy or a political deadlock. For that, the
implementation of quotas is a good alternative as it increases efficiency by
reducing volatility and prevents a crash of the system by preventing an infinite
supply.
In short, Boussard argues that futures markets are a less efficient system than
production quotas due to its lower capability to absorb large amounts of risk than
government is, but when it is possible to have liquid futures markets that result in
a zero “normal backwardation”, than it is doomed to bankruptcy due to an infinite
increase in supply.
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A comment to make on this is that futures contracts are a negotiation between two
parties that results in a fixed price. Out of research seems that it reduces price
volatility in the U.S. milk market with 50%-60% (Maynard, Wolf, and Gearhardt,
2005). However futures contracts do not completely abolish price volatility,
resulting in the presence of price risk aversion by producers, one of the return
strings in the chaotic cobweb model. Futures contracts shift the risk from the
producers to the processors but price volatility will never be completely abolished
as the contracts are negotiated on a regular base and each time prices have to be
negotiated resulting in a low price for the farmer for one contract and a high price
for the other according to expected market prices20. A second comment is that the
supply of milk is not quite as elastic as the supply of wheat for example, due to
the large specific investment cost in cattle and equipment.
6.2 Dairies on the Futures Market
Dairies also have their position on the futures market. In order to hedge their price
risk, dairies forward contract with farmers. By selling futures contracts they can
lock in a profit. Hedging dairy products reduces the volatility of dairy product
prices, which in turn reduces the volatility of the blend price for producers under
the FMMOs. Cropp (1996) discussed the hedging activities of Alto Dairy
cooperatives. Alto Dairy presented its members price bids for which they could
step in a forward contract with the coop. These bids were based on the Class III
price of the previous day. A member could contract a maximum of 50% of its

20

Futures contracts do not reduce price volatility on the market, it only reduces it
for the user when managed appropriately.
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production. Alto would pool the volume of forward contracted milk and sell
cheddar cheese futures on the CSCE equivalent to the forward contracted milk
plus a basis 21 . When the contracted milk is delivered, Alto Dairy would buy
cheddar cheese futures contracts. According to the price of the bought futures
compared to the earlier sold futures, Alto dairy would make a profit or a loss. If
the price had risen, they would lose, however they pay out the farmers a price
lower than the present market price, if the price had fallen, they would win,
however they have to use that profit to pay out a price higher than the present
market price. By locking in the prices, Alto hopes that the profits or losses made
on the futures market will be offset by profits and losses in the cash market,
resulting in a zero cost for price certainty, the transaction cost not considered.
This is made possible due to the close correlation between cash prices and the
dairy futures prices. Alto‟s experience with the project was positive, it showed
that it is possible to use cheddar cheese futures markets to forward contract and
reduce members‟ price risk. The coop encountered however two problems, an
illiquid CSCE market, making it more difficult to set and lift hedges on cheese
and a change in the basis. Alto would solve the latter problem by achieving a
tighter basis as to provide a higher forward milk price (Cropp, 1996).

In a paper by Ling (1996) and a report of the USDA by Ling and Liebrand (1996)
carefulness for hedging practices by cooperatives is advised. Carefulness

21

A basis is the difference between the futures contract price achieved and the
actual cheddar cheese price at the moment of the hedge. It can be negative or
positive dependent on the contracted price for the futures.
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regarding the amount of futures sold is required. Some of its member farmers are
maybe not able to deliver the quantity agreed in the forward contract between the
dairy and the farmer. A part of the futures sold could have the danger of being
speculative, resulting in the risk of uncovered losses on the futures market. For
that reason the amount hedged by the cooperative should best be limited to a
certain share of member‟s production. If the price in the market increases, the
coop can be out-paid by competitors, resulting in a friction with members.
Another possibility is that the futures market is not liquid enough for the coop to
liquidate its futures position by the settlement date. Providing forward contracts
on a voluntary basis can be disliked by the members who do not want to forward
contract. Issuing forward contracts result in a price risk transfer from the members
who contract to the coop. However, a coop is jointly owned by all members,
resulting in all members bearing the risk of the forward contracts. A solution
suggested by Ling is to separate the milk pool obtained through forward contracts
and price independently. Ling formulates the key to successful hedging as
follows:
-

Treat risk management as an integral part of the cooperative‟s overall
corporate strategy. That is combined with the strategies as discussed in
Chapter 4.

-

Adopt an explicit policy for the use of the hedging mechanisms and
communicate this with the members.

-

Set up a process to monitor the cooperative‟s uses of the hedging
mechanisms.
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-

Have safeguards to ensure that controls are in place to protect against
misuse and fraud.

-

Require that risk exposures by using the hedging mechanisms be properly
accounted for in the financial statements to inform members, creditors and
other interested parties.
(Source: Ling, 1996)

A contract between a cooperative and a member is based on the obligation to
procure all members‟ produced milk and the exclusivity of the coop to procure
member‟s milk. Contracts can have all kinds of forms. An example is given for
the case of Alto Dairy cooperatives. The more entrepreneurial organization and
behavior of cooperatives makes it necessary to keep a close eye on the contracts
between the coops and its members as they become more differentiated and
harder to control. With the emergence of futures for dairy products on the
EUREX22 stock exchange in Frankfurt, the possibility for German and European
dairies to reduce price risk through futures is present. However by looking at the
U.S. market, carefulness is required. Nordmilch and FrieslandCampina announced
to procure all members‟ milk when the quota system is abolished. It seems that
duration and price are more important aspects of contract formation (Schlecht and
Spiller, 2009). However, demand is expanding and to announce full procurement
regardless of production of members can strengthen the coop-member
22

EUREX launched the first European futures on butter and skimmed milk
powder in 2010 with help of the dairy industry associations German Dairy
Association and Eucolait and important market participants in the European and
US dairy industry (EUREX, 2010).
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relationship. When the market will be confronted with a reduced demand,
quantity fixation can still be a relevant issue.
6.3 Contracts in a Concentrated Supply and Purchase Market
A new era in the dairy market structure seems inevitable, contract farming, as
seen in other commodity markets and already spreading in the U.S., will gradually
increase due to the increase of price volatility. Dairies contract milk with farmers
and, to lock in a profit, contract milk and dairy products on the futures market.
Dairy farmers can forward contract or sell futures, however to lock in a profit,
contracting input supplies is advisable. Input markets also know an increasing
volatility, and to have certainty of their financial situation, farmers can combine
contracting inputs and output, i.e. raw milk.
The importance of a well established competition law and control institution is
already shown in Chapter 5. However farmers also face an increasing
concentration on the input side, resulting in an unfavorable bargaining position to
form contracts from both sides. With the entrepreneurial cooperatives tending to
behave more like IOF, the possibility and necessity of new bargaining coops or
producer organizations on the market is prevalent. Producer organizations could
provide farmers with hedging skills, contract information and market information
and pool their milk to create a better bargaining position. However, farmers,
unlike laborers, tend to be keen on their independence and the formation of such
producer groups could go difficult.
In a survey by Schlecht and Spiller (2009), the willingness of German farmers to
contract was investigated by means of a survey with 161 farmers in North144

Western Germany, a region were almost all farmers milk is procured by
cooperatives. The researchers found that farmers have a preference for
entrepreneurial freedom and independence. The most important contract attribute
for farmers is the price; the second most important attribute is the volume.
Farmers strongly reject the cooperative price setting due to a perceived lack of
control; instead, they favor frequent price negotiations or the application of a
reference price. As price reflects the farmers‟ profitability and income, the
volume reflects the farmers‟ possibility to grow. Farmers prefer no volume
restrictions in the contract. And if they do estimate production, they do not want a
fine in case of over- or underproduction. Also, the cooperative type exclusive
selling and intake obligations are preferred to stay in place by the farmers. The
preferred duration of a contract is maximum two years, with a cancelation period
as short as possible. Schlecht and Spiller conclude that processors need to
consider the suppliers‟ attitude and preferences for contract attributes, as this
increases the acceptance of contracts by the farmers.
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7 Recommendations for the Players on the Dairy Market
The changing market conditions provide opportunities for the relevant players on
the market. With opening borders, increasing demand and consolidation on every
level of the dairy supply chain, a higher level of business orientation is required to
grasp these constantly changing opportunities and to deal effectively with
weaknesses and avoid future threats. In the scope of a global dairy market,
governments play an important role to stimulate the home businesses towards a
competitive global industry.
7.1 Farmers
Farmers can apply following strategies in the future to reduce market risk and
increase profitability:
-

Grow and specialize to reduce cost and be competitive on the world
market

-

Produce for niche markets where a higher value can be obtained, that is
create added value to milk

-

Differentiate business activities to reduce risk; for example rural tourism,
green energy production.

-

Reduce price risk by forward contract or by hedging on the futures market.

A combination of these strategies is also possible. We can expect a change in the
structure of dairy farms. The evolution to larger more specialize farms will
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continue due to the necessity to produce at lower cost. Contracting will find its
way in the dairy market to serve as a strategy to reduce price risk.
A strategy to ameliorate the bargaining position is the formation of producer
groups. These producer groups will have as purpose to pool milk in order to have
more weight in contract negotiations. In the case farmers are members of
cooperatives, producer organizations can provide independent contract and
market information.
7.2 Industry
The dairy industry faces an increasing competition as dairies continue to merge
and become international players. Competition is not regional or national
anymore, it became international. With huge amounts of capital, large dairies are
able to buy smaller dairies and so increase their market share at the procurement
side and the consumer side. Important strategies for dairies are:
-

Grow and increase efficiency to lower cost of production.

-

Explore niche markets.

-

Add value and differentiate market products to be able to get a higher
profit margin.

-

Explore international markets to reduce risk by differentiating and
enlarging procurement markets and consumer markets and take a global
competitive position.

-

Advertise products to increase demand and obtain a better bargaining
position towards the retail sector.
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-

Invest in member communication and respecting entrepreneurship and
demands of dairy farmers. Create a higher involvement of members in the
company as they are an important source of capital.

-

Utilize the futures market and forward contract with farmers to reduce risk
and stabilize quantity.

-

Cooperatives can further solve for the traditional cooperative problems by
utilizing professional managers, design investment tools with an
individualized character so the members can create their portfolio
according to their risk preferences.

7.3 Interbranch Organizations
The importance of interbranch organizations during these changing market
conditions can be high. International demand is growing and important producing
countries like Germany and the U.S. can take an important position to supply the
growing international demand. It is important that as well as the industry, also the
producers are efficient and demand oriented. A close cooperation between
producers and industry could result in a strong national or in the case of Europe,
union dairy industry. In Germany focus on the producers seems of the highest
priority. Processors seem aware of the market opportunities and invest highly in
value added products and increase their market scope by merging, forming joint
ventures and internationalizing. German dairy farms are still small scaled and
have a low yield per cow resulting in high production costs. In the U.S. the
opposite seems true, the main production is done by highly specialized producers,
the industry though, needs to invest more in international markets. As farmers
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provide the raw material to dairies, this has to be offered at a world competitive
price. Especially cooperatives can be faced with the difficult situation of paying
low market prices to inefficient members. For that reason, cooperation between
farmers and the industry could result in a joint amelioration of the
competitiveness of the whole dairy chain. Interbranch organizations can play a
useful role in research, improvement of quality, promotion and spreading of best
practice in production and processing methods (European Commission, 2010c).
7.4 Policy
In order to adapt to changing market environment, governments in the U.S. and
Europe present new policy measures. In Europe the policy reform was announced
as the “Milk Package” and a proposal was released by the European Commission
at the end of 2010 (European Commission, 2010b). In the U.S., the USDA
presented a report with recommendations for public policy to improve dairy farm
profitability and reduce milk price volatility early 2010 (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2010h).

The milk package was formulated taking into account the recommendations of the
High Level Group on Milk (HLG). The HLG presented a report on 15 June with 7
recommendations for the EC. The EC responded in its proposal on the first three
recommendations (contractual relations, bargaining power of producers and
interbranch organizations) and rapidly responded to the recommendation on
transparency.
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Concerning the contractual relations, the EC regulates several aspects; other
aspects are left to member states in order to satisfy national contract laws
(European Commission, 2010b). The contract shall:
-

Be concluded in advance of the delivery

-

Be made in writing

-

Include:
o The price payable for delivery, which shall:


Be static and be set out in the contract, and/or



Vary only on factors which are set out in the contract, in
particular the development of the market situation based on
market indicators, the volume delivered and the quality or
composition of the raw milk delivered,

o The volume which may and/or shall be delivered and the timing of
deliveries, and
o The duration of the contract, which may include an indefinite
duration with termination clauses
(European Commission,
2010b)

Standardized contracts are not favored by the EU National Competition Agencies.
Contracts should be voluntary; however a code of good conduct and practice by
operators in the dairy value chain would be favorable (European Commission,
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2010c). If a country decides to make contracts compulsory, the above mentioned
rules apply.
Concerning producer organizations the EC proposes to limit the volume pooled
by these organizations to ensure competition23:
-

A maximum of 3.5% of EU milk production can be pooled in a producer
organization to bargain for contracts with the dairy processors.

-

A limit of the national production is proposed to ensure competition in the
supply of raw milk at the national level. A limit of 33% of the national
production would be applied.

The formation of interbranch organizations is highly recommended by the EC for
the reasons discussed in the previous subsection 7.3 Interbranch Organization.
These organizations however should not play a role in any price regulation or
agreement within the dairy chain.
Concerning transparency the EC expressed some concerns. Transparency is not
beneficial to farmers, as soon as the minimum price for milk is reported it
becomes immediately the reference price for processors, this is definitely the case
in an oligopsonistic market (European Commission, 2010c). With the existence of
the EUREX a reference price becomes available for the dairies. As seen in the
U.S., this can result in price matching behavior among dairies, and so result in
lower non-competitive prices for farmers. However, transparency can be
beneficial when farmers are organized in producer organizations. An equal
bargaining volume and equal access to information provide a strong bargaining
23

Too strong producer organizations could result in double marginalization and a
higher cost for the consumer.
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position for producer organizations. Interbranch organizations can play a role in
providing market transparency on contract formation and prices.
The other recommendations by the HLG still to be evaluated by the EC are:
-

Market measures that are green-box compatible and the role of future
markets to reduce income volatility.

-

Innovation and research; i.e. ameliorate the communication between
research centers and governmental institutions.

-

Quality and labeling; i.e. origin of production labeling and handling
imitation dairy products.
(High Level Group on Milk, 2010)

In the report of the USDA‟s Dairy Industry Advisory Committee, compiled out of
several parties from the dairy industry and dairy experts (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2010h), the focus was on 4 different topics:
-

Existing programs and authorities

-

Price protection, stabilization and regulation

-

Income protection and stabilization

-

Profitability and market improvement

In the first topic, the review of the FMMO was advised due to the possible impact
on end-product pricing and so on milk price volatility and the impact of classified
pricing and pooling on processing investment, competition and dairy innovation.
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The use of Farm Loan Programs24, emergency interventions, and a system that
provides transparency of dairy farm profitability were recommended to be further
used and expanded.
Under the second topic it was recommended to eliminate the DPPSP and the
DEIP and use these budget savings to further enhance the safety net for farmers,
provide transparency in dairy prices, explore alternative measures to the current
end product pricing system as under the FMMOs and adopt a growth management
plan25.
Concerning income protection and stabilization the establishment of a credit
system for coops or proprietary firms that procure milk to cover the margin
deposits required to ensure the performance of the terms of a futures contract is
suggested. This should facilitate the access for dairy firms on the futures market
and enhance contract formation on the dairy market. The MILC-program should
be revised on two aspects; provide an insurance program for production
exceeding the cap so to provide protection of income for larger producers and use
an all-milk income/feed cost margin trigger. Also farmers should be able to have a
savings account for which deferred tax rules apply.

24

Farm Loan Programs provides farmers with credit who cannot obtain
commercial credit from a bank, Farm Credit System institution or other lender. It
also issues emergency loans in situations where farmers have been adversely
impacted by severe weather conditions (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2010h).
25
An investigation of the potential of a Growth Management Program (GMP) to
reduce price volatility is provided by Nicholson and Stephenson (2009). They
conclude that a GMP, based on a market access fee and limiting farmers to grow
with a certain percentage; if they grow more they have to pay a fine which is
divided among the other farmers, reduces price fluctuations effectively when they
are induced by normal cyclical variations, however with price shocks the program
does not effectively reduce price fluctuations.
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The last topic concerns profitability and market improvement and advises the
support for competitive market structures, support for export market development,
support for value-added dairy, provide incentives for environmental practices,
phase out ethanol subsidies, improve dairy herd health, provide the access to
immigrant labor sources, support milk quality and restrict the use of dairy
descriptors on product labels (that involves restricting the possibility to free ride
by non-dairy copy products on the image of dairy products).
In both countries the policy makers are further stimulating free markets, though
there is a high concern about the own industry. The income of farmers is tried to
be safeguarded by providing them with possibilities to reduce price risk and
design market programs that are green box compatible.
7.5 SWOT Analysis of the Dairy Market
By interpreting the discussion in previous chapters, the strengths and weaknesses
and opportunities and threats can be listed below for the players, i.e. farmers and
procurers/processors, in the market as also for the market as a whole. There are
many similarities between the German and the U.S. dairy market. This can be
explained due to the fact that both are industrialized markets with a tendency to
open up the market.
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Table 7-1: SWOT analysis German dairy industry.
Strengths

Weaknesses

Orientation to foreign markets

High cost structure dairy farms

Increasing consumer oriented

Oligopsony/Collusion

danger

due

market

to

high

concentration
Competitive dairy processors

Extra cost compared to world
competition

to

incorporate

externalities
Subsidies to incorporate animal welfare and Cooperative-member
environmental externalities for dairy farmers

relationship increasingly under
pressure

High importance for the domestic economy Weak bargaining position to
resulting in policy makers interest

form

contracts

for

dairy

farmers
Opportunities

Threats

Producer organizations to increase bargaining Shift of milk production due to
power stimulated by the EC

regional differences can disrupt
rural societies

Increasing world demand and increasing access Increasing
to foreign markets

in

foreign markets

Market transformation from protectionism to Uncertainty
open markets

production

about

future

policies
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Establishment of a futures market
Interbranch

organizations

Increase of price volatility
to

stimulate Decreasing domestic demand

competitiveness of the whole dairy chain
Lower cost for farmers and the opportunity to
grow for farmers and processors with the
abolishment of the quota system
High value added markets
Niche markets
Differentiation possibilities to reduce risk
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Table 7-2: SWOT analysis U.S. dairy industry.
Strengths

Weaknesses

Increasingly consumer oriented

Oligopsony/Collusion danger due to
high market concentration

Competitive dairy processors

Lower focus of the dairy industry on
international markets

Competitive dairy farms

Low internalization of externalities

Use of futures market to reduce price Weak bargaining position for farmers to
risk

form contracts

Producer organizations (CWT see Cooperative-member
Appendix 2)

relationship

increasingly under pressure

High importance for the domestic
economy resulting in policy makers
interest
Opportunities
Increasing

Threats
world

and

domestic Increasing production in foreign markets

demand.
Market

transformation

from Uncertainty about future policies (e.g.:

protectionism to open markets

policies

to

internalize

externalities;

FMMO)
Interbranch organizations to stimulate Increase of price volatility
competitiveness of the whole dairy
chain
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High value added markets

Shift of milk production due to regional
differences can disrupt rural societies

Niche markets
Differentiation to reduce risk

This market organization seems to be prospering in the short term. However it
must be noticed that this can come under pressure in the long term. Berry (2001)
wrote:
“The developed nations had given to the free market the status of a god, and were
sacrificing to it their farmers, farmlands, and communities, their forests, wetlands,
and prairies, their ecosystems and watersheds. They had accepted universal
pollution and global warming as normal costs of doing business.”
It must be noticed that not every individual on the market follows this tendency;
new ideologies on sustainability26 create a market next to the industrialized one,
though within the framework of policies and law. These markets (farmers market,
local food restaurants …) form an alternative route for farmers and processors to
market their products to an increasing share of the western population that get
aware of the limited capability of the industrialized market to internalize
externalities.

26

Inquieries into the Nature of Slow Money by Woody Tasch (2008) presents the
concept of Slow Money as a new way to invest locally, to invest in soil.
158

8 Conclusion
The dairy market is highly regulated in Germany and the United States. Dairy
policies were implemented to provide farmers a stable price. In Germany the
quota system is the dominant policy. By fixing supply overproduction is
eliminated. In the United States the market is highly regulated by the Federal Milk
Marketing Orders. This policy provides farmers with a minimum, uniform price
and also provides consumers with access to milk. Other policies in both markets
are intervention by purchase and export subsidies. These policies protect the
domestic market for low world market prices and make a higher stable price
possible. Direct payments to support farmers‟ income are also present in both
markets. In Germany these are mostly decoupled, while in the U.S.
countercyclical direct payments are put in place.

However, due to the World Trade agreements the EU and the U.S. are obliged to
open up their markets for world trade. The European Commission decided to
abolish the quota system by 2015 through the means of a soft landing. The
gradual increase of the quota has an effect that quota rents drop and the national
quota was not filled the recent years. Intervention was abolished but was
reinstated due to low market prices in 2009. Decoupled direct payments play an
important role in supporting the income of German dairy farmers. In the U.S.
some changes in the dairy policy were made to fulfill the WTO agreements, i.e.
the change from supporting raw milk price to supporting dairy products with the
Dairy Product Price Support Program, and the implementation of Tariff Rate
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Import Quotas instead of an import tax. Protectionism of these markets is reduced
which has an effect on the market.

The German and the U.S. markets are characterized by an expanding demand for
dairy products. Producers have responded by increasing supply. The German
market is less responsive than the U.S. production market. This is due to different
producer characteristics. Production in the U.S. is more specialized as seen by a
higher yield per cow. Dairy farms in the U.S. have a larger average herd size.
German producers were less flexible to expand production due to the quota
system. The study showed that consolidation on the supplier as well as on the
buyer side is present in both markets. It must be noted that both countries have
different regional characteristics of production, making generalizations less
concrete.

The changing market environment had also an effect on cooperative organization.
Cooperative organizational forms have been transformed in order to adapt new
strategies. This study shows how leading cooperatives in both markets adopt more
and more to an individualized structure. Several forms of financial tools are
established like bonds, delivery rights, and shares. Capital is gained through these
financial tools and through retained earnings. Member participation in the
decision making process is reduced and not according to the principle “one manone vote” anymore. The day to day decisions are taken by CEOs. The cooperative
pricing policy is of less importance. The cooperatives are shareholders of profit
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oriented firms, which price like private firms. UD pricing is the main pricing
method providing competition on the market. Profits are paid out to farmers in
different ways or are retained. By raising capital and reducing member
involvement in the decision making process, cooperatives are more flexible to
react to market changes by adapting strategies. The main strategies applied by the
large cooperatives are value adding, merging and internationalizing. The effect on
cooperative-member relationship is important. The more individualized approach
and entrepreneurial form could result in a lack of trust towards the cooperative in
defending the cooperative values. The transformation to an entrepreneurial
cooperative, which is profit-maximizing, results in two identities for the memberfarmers; the identity of investor-shareholder and the identity of supplier. This
identity can be split, especially when cooperatives start to invest in markets
outside the members‟ market. The shareholder can benefit the presence of unequal
bargaining power between farmer and processor, the farmer however does not.
Cooperatives should understand the importance of informing their memberfarmers about strategic decisions and investments to strengthen the relationship.

The reduction of protection on the domestic markets made competition between
dairies more prominent. A wave of mergers was seen in the U.S. and the EU
market. This raises questions of oligopsony power. The characteristics of milk as
raw product contribute to the possibility of oligopsony power. The study showed
how the pricing methods of the dairies are of importance, and that, under price
matching behavior, competition is reduced. The importance of bargaining
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cooperatives and open membership cooperatives, that price to maximize average
revenue instead of marginal revenue, to increase the price transmission is also
shown. With changing coop structure to more profit oriented businesses, it is
important to consider execution of oligopsony power by entrepreneurial coops
towards their members. This argument is especially relevant in the evaluation by
competition authorities of mergers by cooperatives.

The study also elaborated on the use of futures markets and contract formation as
a means to reduce price risk. Volatility of dairy prices increases as markets get
less protected. In the U.S., the use of futures markets and forward contracts to
hedge price risk is present. It has been proven a useful tool to reduce price risk
however there are some objections towards the system. The main objection is that
the market is to illiquid. Government plays an important role in this issue. By
providing market policies that reduce the volatility of the price no incentives to
use the futures market is given, making the market illiquid. This argument is then
used to ask government to keep on providing protectionist market policies.
Government could reduce protectionist policies and at the same time promote the
use of the futures markets; in this manner a gradual change from government as
price risk buffer to the futures market as price risk buffer could be facilitated.
Another objection is the unbalanced bargaining position between farmers and
dairies. Producer organizations combined with transparency could be a solution
for this problem. Further, it is important for the dairies to take into account the
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preferences of the dairy farmers towards contracting in order to facilitate
contracting.

By looking at the evolution of policies, market conditions, farm structure,
processing structure, cooperative organization and strategies like the use of
futures markets and contracts, trends in the dairy market at both sides of the
Atlantic could be discovered and compared. Taking these trends into account,
future opportunities and threats can be identified. As the dairy market is an
important segment of the economy in both countries, policy makers keep a close
eye on the changes in the market environment. Policy reforms are announced in
both markets, entailing reduced protectionism and increased conformation
towards the WTO agreements. However policy makers also provide the industry
with means to deal with the increased price volatility. In U.S. the implementation
of a Growth Management Plan could reduce price volatility. In Europe a futures
market is established and the formation of interbranch organizations and producer
organizations are stimulated.

The future prospects for the market for dairy products seems prosper. However,
competition is necessary for an efficient market, the importance of a skilled
competition institution seems now more important then ever. If both the national
dairy companies and farmers work towards a competitive position, the supply of
the domestic market can be guaranteed and the benefits in foreign markets can be
reached.
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Appendix 1: Top 20 Processors Germany and U.S.
Table A1-1: Top 20 of German dairy operators 2009 according to milk
quantity processed.
Ran
k

Milk quantities Turnover (Mil.
Company

Euro/kg

Organizational

(Mil. kg)

Euro)

Milk

Form*

Nordmilch
1

Group

4,100

2,500

0.61

Cooperative

2

Humana Group

3,000

2,301

0.77

Cooperative

3

Müller Group

2,150

1,768

0.82

Kapitalgesellschaft

4

Hochwald

1,900

1,170

0.62

Cooperative

1,078

620

0.58

Cooperative

Milch-Union
5

Hocheifel
FrieslandCampi

6

na

983

1,482

1.51

Cooperative

7

Uelzena Group

962

344

0.36

Cooperative

Molkerei
8

Ammerland

957

387

0.40

Cooperative

9

BMI Group

892

492

0.55

Cooperative

10

Rücker

850

344

0.40

Kapitalgesellschaft

Omira/Neuburg
11

er

792

622

0.79

Kapitalgesellschaft

12

Hansa-Milch

740

369

0.50

Kapitalgesellschaft

13

Goldsteig

713

371

0.52

Kapitalgesellschaft

14

Bayernland

700

1,000

1.43

Cooperative

15

Frischli

700

365

0.52

Kapitalgesellschaft

16

Zott

670

790

1.18

Kapitalgesellschaft

Allgäuland17

Käsereien

589

403

0.68

Kapitalgesellschaft

18

Meierei

545

129

0.24

Cooperative
178

Barmstedt
19

Hochland

496

1,100

2.22

Kapitalgesellschaft

441

664

1.51

Kapitalgesellschaft

Ehrmann
20

Group

*The organizational form is according to German law. Kapitalgesellschaft is
an organization regarded as a legal private person by law. It is comparable
with the structure of a limited company. The German forms are GmbH, AG,
KGaA. The cooperative structure is according to the German law an eG.
Data: German Dairy Association (2011) + sites of the respective dairies.
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Table A1-2: Top 20 Dairy companies U.S. according to sales in 2009.

Sales
*
2009
Ran
k

(Mil.
Company

$)

Type

11,15
1

Dean Foods Co.

8

Kraft Foods North America

Publically-Traded Company
Publically-Traded

2

Inc.

4,000

Company/Subsidiary

3

Schreiber Foods Inc.

3,600

Private

4

Kroger Co. Dairy Operations 2,375

Subsidiary

5

Prairie Farms Dairy Inc.

2,302

Cooperative

6

Land O'Lakes Inc.

3,208

Cooperative

7

HP Food LLC

2,200

Private/Subsidiary

8

Lala USA

2,200

Private

9

Leprino Foods Co.

2,150

Private

10

Dairy Farmers of America

2,090

Cooperative

11

Dairygold Inc.

2,000

Cooperative/Subsidiary

12

Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream

2,000

Subsidiary

13

Unilever Ice Cream

1,925

Subsidiary

14

Great Lakes Cheese Co.

1,800

Private
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15

California Dairies Inc.

1,410

Cooperative

Associated Milk Producers
16

Inc.

1,400

Cooperative

17

Fonterra North America

1,300

Subsidiary

18

Yoplait USA

1,299

Subsidiary

Grassland Dairy Products
19

Inc.

1,199

Private

20

Foremost Farms USA

1,141

Cooperative

*Only sales of finished dairy products are accounted for.
Source: Dairy Foods (2010).
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Appendix 2: Herd Retirement Program by CWT
The Cooperatives Working Together program is a dairy industry sponsored
program initiated in 2003 by the National Milk Producers Federation. Its aim is to
support dairy prices by controlling supply through herd retirements and
stimulating demand by providing export assistance. In 2009 the export assistance
was eliminated as CWT believes that the herd retirement program is the most
effective one. The herd retirement program provides farmers, who are member of
CWT or an indirect member through a cooperative who is a member, with
financial compensation if they decide to take dairy cows out of production. The
farmers can offer a maximum bid of $5.25 per hundredweight raw milk to CWT.
In 2009 there were 3 opportunities for farmers to offer a bid to CWT. The
organization chooses the lower bids first to decline the herd. The payment CWT
offers is the bid price multiplied by the herd‟s milk production over the 12months period starting on September 1 2008 through August 31 2009 for the
2009-3 Herd Retirement Program. The effect of the Herd Retirement Program by
achieving a reduction in the national herd to balance out supply and demand is a
higher price for milk producers with the benefit of receiving compensation for
declining their herd. The effects on the herd size and on the milk price are shown
in Figures A2-1 and A2-2. As can be seen in Figure A2-1, the Herd Retirement
Program in 2009 was the largest one in the history of CWT.
The participation payment for farmers is $0.10 per hundredweight since 2007,
before it was only $0.05. These are the funds CWT uses to compensate for the
loss in cows for farmers who reduce their herd. The farmers can be joined through
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a cooperative that makes the transaction of the $0.10 easier by deducting it every
month from the farmer‟s account. The National Milk Producer Federation
estimated a net increase of the milk price by $1.30 per hundredweight if the milk
supply was reduced by 4.6 billion pounds. However, after adapting this amount
for a loss in MILC-program benefits due to the price increase, this would mean an
increase of $0.86 per hundredweight. However with a reduction of 1.2 million
pounds the adjusted price increase would only be $0.23. Of course this is a benefit
for every dairy farmer and not only for the ones who participate in the program
and pay the $0.10 (Gould, 2009).

But with the synergy of several herd

retirements the overall effect on the price was estimated on $ 1.54 per
hundredweight from January until November 2009 by Dr. Scott Brown of the
University of Missouri (Cooperatives Working Together, 2010).

Figure A2-1: Effect of CWT on herd size.
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Source: Brown (2009).

Figure A2-2: Effect of CWT on milk price.
Source: Brown (2009).

As mentioned before the funds for the CWT program are provided by
membership payments of $0.10 per hundredweight marketed milk. The total
contributions for the period January 2009 until August 2009 accounted $71
million. With a total carryover of $76 million from 2008 and interests this resulted
in revenue of $148 million. The expenses for the Herd Retirement Program 20091 and 2009-2 were $140 million, administration accounted for $2.5 million and
interests and fees accounted for $0.6 million. The total expenses for the period
January 2009 until August 2009 were $143 million. This left CWT in a positive
balance at the end of August 2009.
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Appendix 3: Constraints of Classical Cooperatives
The five classical constraints of ill-defined property rights in a cooperation are
briefly explained. Their relevance in this topic is highly. Because of the changing
market situation the ill-defined property rights turn into several not negligible
disadvantages, also called cooperative baggage. Property rights are defined as a
socially and legally enforced right to select uses of an economic good (Cook and
Iliopoulos, 1999). Ill-defined property rights undermine efficiency because the
decision maker does not bear the full impact of his decision. The ill-defined
property rights create the opportunity of a conflict between investor and user. The
conflicts are about decision control and residual claim. They appear when IOF
ameliorate to the market failures or when there is an economic depression in
which it is necessary to act flexible. This cooperative baggage is referred to as
internal pressure to reform the co-operative.

Free-rider Problem
The free rider problem occurs when property rights are untradeable, insecure or
unassigned (Cook, 1995). This involves the sharing of benefits the cooperation
induces with members or non-members of the cooperation that did not attributed
entirely to receive those benefits. This is a mayor problem in open membership
cooperatives. The insider free rider problem is a more complex type of this
problem of ill-defined property rights. It refers to the problem occurring when
new members of the cooperative are entitled to the same amount of patronage and
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residual claimant as existing members and are entitled to the same payment per
unit of patronage.
The free rider problem induces a lack of incentive to invest in the cooperative
because the full benefits of the investment are not returned to the members who
invest. This can result into a chronically shortage of capital in the cooperative or a
more reliance on debt.

Portfolio Problem
The lack of transferability, liquidity and appreciation mechanism for exchange of
residual claims is an obstruction for members to match their cooperative asset
portfolio with their risk preferences (Cook, 1995). This has as consequence that
members who are taking more risk than willing are pressing the cooperative
management to adapt the portfolios to a lower risk suiting their own risk-return
trade-off. Since equity is divided in patronage and retained earnings used for
investment, a lower risk involves most of the time lower investment, which can
result in a suboptimal financial structure and lower expected returns.

Horizon Problem
The horizon problem occurs when a member‟s residual claim on the net income
generated by an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset (Porter et al.,
1987). Members of a co-operative are not sure they will be a member of the
cooperative until the asset they helped to invest in is worthless. If a member steps
out before the end of the production life of the asset he helped to invest in, he
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would have a loss. In an IOF this does not occur since the transferability of shares
on the stock market allows the value of the shares to contain the expected future
earnings of the long-term investment. The result is that there is a disincentive to
invest in long-term assets.

Control Problem
The control problem occurs when the board of directors has incomplete
information about the interests of their members and the other way around. This
agency cost increases with an increasing number of members and organizational
complexity. Unlike an IOF, the co-operative does not get the incentive by
publically traded stock so operational inefficiencies can go unobserved. In a large
cooperative, members also have a lower incentive to monitor the performance of
the management and board of directors due to their lower individual impact to
make a change.

Influence Problem
The influence problem occurs when the possibility within a cooperative exist for
its members to have different objectives, this can occur in a cooperative with a
widely variety of activities. The influence of a part of members with a different
interest than another can result in unbalanced distribution of wealth within the
cooperative. This is a result of the dual role of the members as user and investor.
As an investor and provider of capital, they have the power to steer the

187

cooperative in the direction that will benefit them as user the most. This makes
management of the cooperative more difficult.
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Appendix 4: Merger Friesland Foods/ Campina: Investigation of the
European Commission
In 2009 two main Dutch dairies, Friesland Foods and Campina, merged.
According to European Commission Merger Regulation the two dairies asked
approval of the European Commission. The EC concluded that a reduction of
competition would take place on the market for cheese and fresh dairy and long
life dairy drinks. Also the reduction of competition on the procurement market
could lead to negative consequences for consumers. The new formed dairy
FrieslandCampina would be able to raise it prices on the downstream market.
However due to higher performance of the cooperative the member farmers could
enjoy a higher revenue per liter milk delivered which could involve reduced
competition on the procurement market and intensify the position of
FrieslandCampina. Because of these arguments, the EC allowed the merger if
FrieslandCampina would reduce its market share, sell certain processing firms
and reduce its amount milk processed.

On 12 June 2008 the European Commission received a notification of the
proposed merger pursuant according to Article 4 of the EC Merger Regulation.
The Commission initiated proceedings on 17 July 2008 on the basis that the
concentration raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market and the functioning of the European Economic Area Agreement. The
merger case is referred to as Case No COMP/M.5046-Friesland Foods/Campina.
This discussion is based on an article of de La Mano et al. (2009).
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The parties
Friesland Foods and Campina were before the merger the two largest dairy
cooperatives in the Netherlands. Friesland foods counted in 2007 9,417 members
while Campina counted 6,885. The total amount of dairy farmers in the
Netherlands in 2007 was 22,000. Campina was active in Europe, North and South
America and Asia while Friesland Foods was active in Europe, the Middle-East,
Asia and Africa as well as sales worldwide of dairy ingredients for professional
and industrial customers.
As the two companies are cooperatives, this merger involves more than a
combined procurement of raw milk from farmers; the member-famers have a
relationship stronger than mere an economic one with the merged entity. The
member-farmers are also the owners of the coop and for that involved in the
governance of the coop. Further, member farmers are obliged to sell all their
produced milk to the coop as the coop is obliged to accept that milk.
FrieslandCampina declared in their Half Annual Report 2010 that it will keep
procuring all the produced milk from their member-farmers even after the
abolishment of the quotas (FrieslandCampina, 2010a). Another special
relationship is the performance payments to member farmers additional on the
guaranteed price. It is obvious that there is a strong link between the coop and its
members due to the profit-milk price relation and profit-investor relation. Farmers
have a disincentive to leave the coop first due to the promise to procure. Milk is a
highly perishable product and the promise to procure reduces the uncertainty and
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risk of not finding an outlet. Secondly if farmers sell their bonds they cannot
benefit from the future profits of recent investments.

With this merger Friesland Foods and Campina expected to be able to anticipate
better and the act more powerful on the each time faster changing market
conditions like:
-

the liberalization of the market and its deregulation

-

the increasing competition on the regional and global markets

-

the high fluctuation on the market for dairy

-

the increasing global consumption of dairy products

(Source: FrieslandCampina, 2009)

The investigation
Procurement of raw milk:
Friesland Foods and Campina argued that the procurement of raw milk is subnational in scope. The EC stated that it was national in scope for several reasons27.
They argued that the costs of procurement are depended on other factors than only
distance, as there are the size of the plants and the size of the farms that source the
plants. Economies of scale can reduce the procurement cost. Also the competitors
27

In a recent available report from the Bundeskartellamt on the merger of
Humana‟s and Nordmilch‟s sales department into Nord Contor, the procurement
markets were defined as the area within 150km around the plant. Even though
Humana and Nordmilch have a share in several of the investigated markets equal
or more then 40%, the Bundeskartellamt decided that there were still enough
outside options for farmers (Germany, Bundeskartellamt, 2009).
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of Friesland Foods and Campina collect raw milk in areas that extend beyond the
working areas of the parties and cover a substantial part of the Netherlands.
Another reason why the Commission decided that the procurement market is
national in scope is that the competitors of the parties do not take the price
Campina or Friesland Foods pays to their farmers as a benchmark price, while
other dairies do, irrespective of the region where these farmers are located.
The total market share of the merged entity is on national level 70% to 80% (de
La Mano et al., 2009). The average yearly Dutch national production during
2006-2009 was 11 billion kilogram (Netherlands, The Statistics Netherlands,
2010). Together with the fact that dairy farmers are badly organized, there is a
strong indication of a dominant position for the merged entity on the procurement
market for raw milk.
The Commission however, found that the dominant position of FrieslandCampina
on the procurement market would not lead to lower prices for farmers as the
structure of the merged entity is a cooperative one. The promise to procure the
milk from its members and the fact that farmers own the company will lead to not
lowering the purchase of milk thus raising the price on the downstream market.
The Commission did find out that FrieslandCampina‟s dominant position could be
a threat to downstream competitors as they would have difficulties to source raw
milk. Also, as FrieslandCampina would have a dominant position on the markets
for some dairy products (cheese and fresh dairy products), they would be able to
higher the price for consumers and thus earn higher profits. This would entitle
them to give farmers a higher price for their milk delivered as the payout price is
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directly linked to higher profits, thus reducing the possibilities for other
downstream competitors to procure raw milk. While offering the same benefits to
farmers like the other cooperatives on the Dutch dairy market, like stability of
income, assurance of procuring all farmers‟ milk produced and long standing
relationships, the position of the merged entity would only gain dominance by
reducing the possibility for other downstream competitors to compete. For these
reasons the Commission decided to implement the merger conditions as
mentioned above.

Fresh dairy products:
The market of fresh dairy products includes fresh basic dairy products (i.e. fresh
milk, fresh butter milk and plain yoghurt), value added yoghurt and quark, fresh
flavored dairy drinks, fresh custard and porridge. In these markets several submarkets are defined that we will not discuss here as it is not relevant to investigate
the attitude of the EC towards mergers. What is important to mention is that for
every product the market definition is important in order to assess the dominant
position of the merged entity. The characteristics of the product are important
(brand or private label, organic or non-organic, health drinks or non-health drinks)
as also the distribution channel (retail or Out of Home) for the products. Based in
these parameters the Commission found a dominant position of FrieslandCampina
for several fresh dairy products due to the parties‟ high combined share on the
market, the fact that they were regarded as each other‟s closest competitors
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(resulting in the difficulty for costumers to switch to alternative suppliers) and the
difficulty for competitors to expand production whenever a price increase occurs.

Cheese:
The market investigation showed that the cheese supply chain in the Netherlands
has many specific features. There are two Dutch-type cheeses based on the
production level: naturally matured cheese or rindless cheese (i.e. cheese that is
wrapped in a plastic foil when it is young and does not mature any further).
Dutch-type cheese is sold in the Netherlands to specialized cheese wholesalers,
who are active at the intermediate level between production and downstream
distribution channels, or to retailers. The cheese wholesalers often buy cheese at
the age of 15 days to stock it and let it further ripen, after which they sell it to
downstream distribution channels in the Netherlands. The division of the markets
is done by looking in which downstream channel the cheese is marketed. The
investigation found out that the market for matured cheese is national of scope
while the market for rindless cheese is international of scope with important
markets in the Netherlands and Germany.
The investigation by the Commission found out that due to the merger, the
competition on the markets for the sale of Dutch-type cheese to specialized cheese
wholesalers and to retailers would be impeded in the Netherlands. This result is
based on the high market shares of the parties, the closeness of competition
between the parties so that specialized cheese wholesalers and retailers have
limited outside options, the limited prospects of future entry and expansion and
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the fact that all countervailing factors put forward by the parties were found to be
insufficient to prevent the merged entity to increase prices.

The conditions to merger
On 17 December 2008 the commission gave permission for the merger under
several conditions. To meet those conditions FrieslandCampina had to sell a
Dutch-type cheese plant in The Netherlands, finish a part of their activities on the
Dutch market for daily fresh dairy products and quit some brands of the long life
dairy drinks production in Belgium and The Netherlands. The merged company
was also obliged to decrease its share on the Dutch procurement market for raw
milk to free a quantity of 1.2 billion kilogram milk to be available to procure by
(new) other processors of fresh dairy and nature-ripened cheese. This condition is
binding until 2017 or when the commission decides not to.
To meet these conditions Friesland Foods Fresh at Nijkerk was sold to Arla Foods
from Denmark. Friesland Foods Fresh covers the products fresh milk, fresh
buttermilk, plain yoghurt, value added yoghurt and quark, fresh custard, porridge,
fresh flavored dairy drinks, fresh cream and organic fresh basic dairy products.
For the use of the brand Friesche Vlag a licensed agreement was made for a
period of 5 years followed by a black-out. Milcobel took over the sale of two
brands of the long life dairy drinks. The cooperative milk delivery union
DeltaMilk took over the cheese activities of FrieslandCampina in one plant in
Bleskensgraaf. The Dutch Milk Foundation was founded to implement the
conditions on raw milk.

The foundation managed the transmission of milk
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delivery to other dairies (Arla Foods and Deltamilk) and manages also the stepout of member-farmers from FrieslandCampina. The member-farmers who decide
to leave FrieslandCampina and deliver their milk to another dairy, get a premium
of 5 euro per 100 kilogram milk. This step-out contributes also to the reduction of
the procurement of milk on the market.
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Appendix 5: Description of 4 Dairy Cooperatives
FrieslandCampina
FrieslandCampina was formed out of the merger between Zuivelcoöperatie
Friesland Foods U.A. (Friesland Foods) and Zuivelcoöperatie Campina U.A.
(Campina). The dairy is active on several markets including the procurement
market for milk and the production and sale of various dairy products for
consumers and professional and industrial consumers. FrieslandCampina is the
biggest dairy cooperative of the world and the third biggest dairy company after
Nestlé and Danone. The headquarters are in the Netherlands but the countries of
activity are scattered over Europe and the world. The main countries where
FrieslandCampina is active are Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany.
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Structure
Zuivelcoöperatie
FrieslandCampina U.A.

Members

100% owner

District Counsel

Koninklijke FrieslandCampina
N.V.

Member Counsel

Share Holders Meeting

Cooperative Counsel

Board of Directors of the
Cooperative

Counsel of commissionairs

Executive Board

Figure A5-1: Organizational structure FrieslandCampina.
Source: FrieslandCampina, 2010b.

The Zuivelcoöperatie FrieslandCampina is a cooperative with approx. 16,000
member-farmers in The Netherlands, the west of Germany and the Belgian
province Antwerp. The cooperative owns the firm Koninklijke FrieslandCampina
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N.V.28, which is processing and selling the members‟ milk. The member-farmers
are thus through the cooperative owner of the firm FrieslandCampina.

The member-farmers are divided geographically in 21 districts. Each district has
an elected board of 10 people which forms the connection between the memberfarmers and the cooperative. The district board members have a vote in the
Member Counsel according to the volume of milk produced in their district. The
Member Counsel consists of the district board members and 9 member-farmers
who are elected to govern the cooperative, the Board of Directors of the
Cooperative. The Cooperative Counsel exist of 21 district board members who
advice the Board of Directors of the Cooperative about investments and mergers.
This is the description of the cooperative structure, on the other hand there is the
structure of a firm called N.V. According to Dutch law an N.V. must have a
meeting of the shareholders at least once a year. This meeting of shareholders
represents the highest organ of the N.V. In the structure of FrieslandCampina N.V.
the shareholders are represented by the Member Counsel. The daily running of
business is in the hands of the executive board existing of CEOs. A Counsel of
Commissionaires is requested in a firm of that extent. The task of this counsel is
to keep an eye on the Executive Board. In FrieslandCampina N.V. this counsel is
represented by the Board of Directors of the Cooperative plus 4 external members.

Activities

28

N.V. stands for Naamloze Venootschap which is a business structure
comparable with the joint stock company.
199

FrieslandCampina has several activities. The main activities are procuring milk,
processing milk, marketing and selling dairy products.
FrieslandCampina is obliged to procure the milk from its members as the
members are obliged to deliver the milk to their cooperative. This results in a
constant flow of raw milk to the cooperative. The delivery rights (quotas) are
owned by farmers but administrated by FrieslandCampina.

FrieslandCampina has more then 30 known brands in dairy products (Campina,
Cécémel, Fristi, Joyvalle, Landliebe, Optimel, Yazoo, …), fruit juices
(Appelsientje, DubbelFriss, …) and sport drinks (Extran) for consumers, cream
and butter products, desserts, ice-cream, milk shakes (Debic, Hollandia and
Polderland) for professional consumers and ingredients for industrial retailers
(Creamy Creation, Kievit, Domo, …).
The firm is present in 24 countries in which it sells or processes dairy. The focus
on Asia and the expanding market share are main goals. Yearly the firm processes
10.8 billion kilogram milk from which 8.7 billion is delivered from the memberfarmers (FrieslandCampina, 2010b).
The main goal of the firm is to expand, become more profitable and valorize milk.
FrieslandCampina wants to be strong on the market by providing high value dairy
products like dairy drinks, cheese, ingredients for baby and child food, products
for the hotel and catering industry, bakeries and professional kitchens and
providing the food industry with specific ingredients. The aim is to shift
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production of bulk commodities like milk powder, casein and basic cheese to
specialized products with a higher value for which the profit margin is bigger.

Performance
This is based on the year report 2009 of the Royal FrieslandCampina N.V.
(FrieslandCampina, 2009).
FrieslandCampina N.V. had a yearly net revenue of 8.2 billion euro in 2009. This
has shrunk compared with 2008 with 14% due to a low price-level for products as
milk powder, caseins and basic cheese. The profit of the company however raises
with 35% compared with 2008 to 182 million euros. This resulted in a
performance payment of 0.59 euro per 100 kilogram milk to farmers who
received a price 26% lower than 2008 i.e. 26.99 euro per 100 kilogram milk
inclusive the bonus. The pricing for raw milk by FrieslandCampina is based on
the average market price. The guaranteed price is calculated by taking the average
milk price for Germany, the milk price of Arla Foods in Denmark, of Bel
Leerdammer, Cono Kaasmaker and DOC Kaas in the Netherlands and of
Milcobel in Belgium. Each month the guaranteed price is formed from the
expected guaranteed price for that month and any settlement of differences in the
expectations from preceding months. Additionally a performance payment of 25%
of the companies result is divided to the member farmers at the end of the year.
75% of the profit goes to the reserves with which the company wants to make
autonomic investments, either directly (60%) or through the issue of bonds to
members (15%) (de la Mano, 2009). As demand in the whole world decreased
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due to the financial and economic crisis of 2009, FrieslandCampina was still able
to raise its profits. The company felt the pressure due to lower exports of milk
powder, caseins and basic cheese as the euro held its strong position in the
financial market in comparison with the dollar. One reason for higher profits is its
growing market share in South-East Asia and Africa for which the demand still
increased but less than the predicted trend. The EU restored the intervention by
buying butter and milk powder as also the export subsidies for milk powder,
butter and cheese. These measures helped to keep the domestic price at level.
The company processed in 2009 10.8 billion kilogram milk, 6% less than in 2008.
81% of that milk is produced by its member farmers. Its most important markets
are located in Europe, Asia and Africa. Figure A5-2 shows the geographical
market shares based on their contribution to the revenue in 2009.

Figure A5-2: Geographical market share FrieslandCampina.
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Source: FrieslandCampina, 2009.

Nordmilch
The following description is mainly based on the Annual Report 2009 of
Nordmilch (Nordmilch, 2010). Nordmilch is Germany‟s largest dairy company.
The cooperative has around 7,000 members, markets around 4 billion kg milk and
has a turnover of 2.5 billion euro in 2008. In 2008 66% of the milk marketed was
delivered by members while in 2009 80% was delivered by members. An increase
of milk from members (due to a merger with the East German coop Dargun eG
Pommernmilch) and a reduction of all milk marketed contributed to this
difference. The industry business and cheese are among Nordmilch‟s key incomegenerating pillars.

Nordmilch strategies to be a competitive market player can be summed as
follows:
-

Focus on markets with a rising demand. Nordmilch had a strong growth in
the production of cheese.

-

Create countervailing power towards the retail sector. Nordmilch merged
its sales department with Humana, the second largest German cooperative.
The new entity is called NordContor.

-

Nordmilch invested in advertisement by showing product specific spots on
television.
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-

Next to merging the sales department, Nordmilch bought an East German
cooperative, enlarging its processing capacity and its market presence.

-

Nordmilch also invested in value added products and branded products.
This was made possible due to a restructuring scheme during 2003-2008
with an investment of 400 million euro.

-

Focus on export markets in Asia and Africa.

-

To strengthen it position on the market Nordmilch and Humana will
merge their processing companies in the beginning of April. The new
company will be called Deutsches Milchkontor GmbH. The cooperative
mother companies will stay unchanged and become equal shareholders in
the new entity
(Source: Nordmilch,
2011a).

Unfortunately information on the organizational structure of the company is
limited. The coop applies the one man-one vote principle. 20 members elect one
delegate in one district (Nordmilch, 2011b). The cooperative exists of a
Supervisory Board (compiled out of employee elected members and others) which
has as a task to monitor the Management Team (compiled out of CEOs) that runs
the company Nordmilch GmbH. The Board of Nordmilch eG (compiled out of
farmers) act as an interface between the Management Team and the farmers. No
information was available on who elects who, which makes it hard to evaluate to
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voice of the farmers in the cooperative. However following citation shows the
profit oriented approach of the Management Team:
“Responsibility for the cooperative’s business operations lies with the wholly
owned subsidiary NORDMILCH GmbH, while the cooperative NORDMILCH eG
(eG standing for “eingetragene Genossenschaft”) (the eG) focuses entirely on
milk production and cooperative holding company duties. Two irrevocable
contracts form a strong communal bond between the two organisations. The
emphasis on business know-how on the one hand and production know-how on
the other maximises competence in both fields – in the interest of high market
returns and competitive milk prices.” (Nordmilch, 2011a)

The members of Nordmilch have to own delivery rights in order to deliver. In
2009, this was 4 EUR/100kg. On the patronage the member gets interest, which
was 4% in 2009 (Nordmilch, 2011b).

The earnings of Nordmilch are distributed among farmers according to the
quantity they delivered, after deducting costs for marketing or milk collecting
(Nordmilch, 2011b).

Fonterra
Fonterra Cooperative Group Ltd has more than 10,463 shareholders (Fonterra,
2011) and markets around 90% of the New Zealand milk production, i.e. around
15 billion kilograms. The coop exports 90% of its shareholders production with
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main export products milk powder, butter, casein and anhydrous milk fat (Nilsson
and Ohlsson, 2007). The coop is responsible for more than one third of the
international trade in dairy products (Fonterra, 2011).
Fonterra‟s focus strategies are (as stated on their website):

- Ensure Fonterra remains one of the lowest cost, sustainable dairy cooperatives in the world.
-

Build trusting partnerships with customers by being a multi-origin

supplier, allowing us to build more valuable relationships through supply
chain integration and innovation.
- In high growth markets, where it is not practical to use New Zealand
milk, we will leverage our cow to consumer expertise to take leadership
positions using locally produced milk.
- Make Fonterra products the first choice of customers and consumers
wherever we do business
(Fonterra, 2011)

Fonterra‟s main strategy is to be the lowest cost supplier of commodity dairy
products. The comparative advantage of Fonterra lays in it size, from which it
through economies of scale can reduce it‟s per unit cost and in it‟s members‟
possibility to produce at low cost compared to other dairy exporting countries like
the EU member states. It is then also obvious that its main products are
commodities.
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Another strategy is to increase the level of internationalization by making foreign
direct investments in local foreign production.
The strategy to build out partnerships and joint ventures is also pursued, such as
an alliance with Nestlé, a joint venture with Arla Foods in Great Britain and a
joint venture with Dairy Farmers of America (Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007).

The organizational structure of Fonterra is shown in Figure A5-3.

New Zealand Dairy Farmer
Shareholders in Fonterra

Shareholders‟ Council

Board of Directors

Milk Commissioner

Fonterra Cooperative Group

Fonterra Enterprises

NZMP
New Zealand Milk
Operating Division

Figure A5-3: Organizational Structure Fonterra.
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Source: Nilsson and Ohlsson, 2007; Fonterra, 2011.

The Board of Directors exist of nine directors chosen by the shareholders,
additionally three directors are chosen by the nine directors for there specialist
skills resulting in a board of nine directors. The Shareholders‟ Council exists of
46 Councilors representing the shareholders. The council keeps an eye on the
board to ensure that shareholders‟ interests are taken into account. The council
also appoints a Milk Commissioner who arbitrates in disputes between
shareholders and the coop.
The voting is based on a quantity approach, which entails one vote per 1,000kg of
milk solids delivered by the shareholder with an exception for the election of the
Councilors for the Shareholders‟ Council where each shareholder has two votes.

Fonterra Cooperative Group exists of different business branches. NZMP takes
the ingredient business for its account. This involves the collection of milk,
manufacturing and packaging items and the operation of a supply chain linking
production plants in New Zealand and overseas. The New Zealand Milk business
branch takes the consumer section for its account by selling branded products
internationally as also standing in for the operation of plants abroad. Fonterra
Enterprises supports Fonterra‟s core business e.g., a biotechnology company,
technology development, a rural retailer and an agricultural website.
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The payout to shareholders exists out of two components: the Actual Milk Return
and a value-added component. The Actual Milk Return is calculated based on
Fonterra‟s revenues and costs. The value-added component is calculated using the
coop‟s net profits from capital investments, after an amount for reinvestments has
been deducted. As Fonterra has a market share of around 90% it can not compare
its performance with other processors in New Zealand. A benchmark price is
calculated by an independent valuer, Standard & Poor. This price, also called the
Commodity Milk Price is a theoretical estimate of the price an invented efficient
processor could pay out and still make an adequate return on capital. This price is
based on international commodity prices and foreign exchange rates less an
assessment of efficient manufacturing costs.

The investment made by shareholders is done through the purchase of Fair Value
Shares. The shareholders are required to hold one share for each kilogram of milk
solids supplied. Fonterra used to pay out farmers when they would leave the coop,
nowadays they put up a market Trading Among Farmers where farmers can buy
and sell their shares. This ensures Fonterra with a permanent share capital. Also
by issuing the Fair Value Shares, Fonterra made it possible by creating
individually owned investment instruments to raise capital and to invest in a
differentiation strategy next to the cost leadership strategy.

As Fonterra collects 94% of the milk production in New Zealand in 2007/08
government implemented several policies in order to limit the risk of abusive
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practices by using market power. The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act allows
farmers open entry and exit to and from Fonterra. This is done by compelling the
dairy to issue and redeem cooperative shares at the same price. The Act also
allows member farmers to deliver 20% of their weekly production to an
independent dairy processor without having to redeem shares. Also the act makes
sure that one third of the supply contracts expires or can be terminated at the end
of each season, limiting the possibility for Fonterra to lock in producers. The Raw
Milk Regulations of 2001 give the Minister of Agriculture the possibility to
compel Fonterra to supply up to 5% of its milk to independent processors at a
regulated price so ensuring entry possibilities and protecting consumers.

Dairy Farmers of America
Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) has 9,572 members with an annual milk
production of 17 billion kilograms. In total the cooperative markets 28.5 billion
kilograms of milk (Dairy Farmers of America, 2011a). The primary activity of
DFA is to market milk. DFA delivers fluid milk to other processors as Dean
Foods, Lala USA, Kroger Co. Dairy Operations, Kraft Foods.

Its core business DFA defines as follows:

“DFA is a milk marketing cooperative and dairy foods processor dedicated to
delivering value to members through secure markets, competitive pricing and

210

increasing value throughout the entire dairy chain.” (Dairy Farmers of America,
2011a)
Marketing29 raw milk is the core business of DFA with a contribution of 76% to
net sales in 2010 (Dairy Farmers of America, 2011c).

In addition to marketing milk, DFA is a dairy foods processor with investments in
brands and plants that bring added value to members. Some of these investments
include:


20 DFA-owned manufacturing plants that produce a wide range of
products



Fluid milk joint ventures and shared ownership in milk bottling plants



Joint-venture partnerships with America‟s best private-label food
marketing companies



Innovative partnerships resulting in specially formulated ingredients,
products and packaging

(Dairy Farmers of America, 2011a)

Additionally DFA entered the Hispanic market in 2010 by the acquisition of La
Vaquita brand cheese, which is their first step in foreign markets by direct
investments. The internationalization strategy is recognized by the cooperative.

29

The term “bargaining” instead of “marketing” was used in this document to
describe the action involving selling members‟ raw milk without processing it.
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DFA started to produce Gouda cheese as it is a type of cheese highly demanded in
export markets (Dairy Farmers of America, 2011c).

The organizational structure of DFA as shown in Figure A5-4.

District Member Meetings

Area Council

Area Resolutions Commitee

Delegates

Corporate Board

CEO

Corporate Resolutions
Committee

Figure A5-4: Organizational structure of Dairy Farmers of America.
Source: Dairy Farmers of America, 2011b.

Although DFA is a national raw milk marketing cooperative, it is divided into
seven areas, ensuring grassroots representation of its members.

Areas are organized into districts, in which members elect representatives to serve
on their Area Council. The Area Council controls and advises the Corporate
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Board, as also monitors the marketing of milk and performs any duties as
established by the Corporate Board. Out of the Area Council representatives are
elected by the delegates to serve the Board of Directors that guides the
cooperative and establishes policies and business directions, also the board of
directors elect a CEO. The Delegates represent one farmer on fifty, next to
electing the members of the board of directors it also approves or rejects
resolutions that passed the process of resolution approval through the Area
Resolution Committee and the Corporate Resolution Committee (Dairy Farmers
of America, 2011b).

Dairy producers are not just members of DFA, they are owners. In order to join
DFA and deliver milk a base capital of 1.75$/cwt is required (Dairy Farmers of
America, 2011b). Profits are redistributed to members based on their patronage in
DFA (Dairy Farmers of America, 2011a).
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Appendix 6: Processor Facilities Locations in U.S. and Germany.

Figure A6-1: Processing facilities of the 6 largest dairies in Germany.
Source: Friedrich (2010)
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Figure A6-2: Processing facilities of the 8 largest dairies of North America in
U.S.
Source: Dairy Foods, 2010.
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